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A COLLABORATIVE MODEL OF OFFSHORE
LEGAL OUTSOURCING
Cassandra Burke Robertson ∗
International outsourcing has come to the legal profession. The ABA and
other bar associations have given it their stamp of approval, and an ailing
economy has pushed both clients and firms to consider sending more legal
work abroad. This article integrates research from the fields of
organizational behavior, social psychology, and economic theory to analyze
the effectiveness of the legal outsourcing relationship. It identifies
organizational pressures in the practice of law that affect how legal work is
performed in a transnational context, and it examines how individuals on
both sides of the outsourcing process influence the success or failure of a
globalized practice. Ultimately, the article recommends that parties
involved in legal offshoring should move away from a model of
disaggregation and toward a model of collaboration. Unlike a
disaggregation model that assumes outsourcing vendors will autonomously
complete discrete legal tasks, a collaborative model would explicitly focus
on cooperation, communication, and renegotiation of status and resources.

INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2010, the dismissal of a libel case involving Sacha Baron
Cohen’s “Ali G” character was affirmed on appeal. 1 By itself, the dismissal
was nothing unusual; Cohen’s comedic style has made him a target for
defamation lawsuits arising from the films Borat, Bruno, and the television
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1.
Doe v. Channel Four Television Corp., No. B217145, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2468, at *1, *11, *23 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2010).
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show Da Ali G Show. 2 Cohen’s domestic broadcaster twice settled libel
suits based on an Ali G skit 3—a typical litigation strategy when the cost of a
nuisance settlement is cheaper than paying to defend against a meritless
claim. 4 But when the U.K. distributor was sued in California over the same
skit, 5 it decided to handle the suit differently. Rather than spending a great
deal of money defending the claim—or agreeing to settle for a fee less than
the cost of a traditional defense—the defendant outsourced its defense to an
Indian firm associated with the defendant’s U.S. counsel. 6 The Indian firm
drafted a motion for summary judgment, which was filed by an associated

2.
See, e.g., Palestinian Files Libel Suit Over “Bruno”, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 9,
2009, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/palestinian-files-libel-suit-bruno92191.
3.
Leigh Holmwood, Ali G: US Judge Throws Out Woman’s $800,000 Libel Claim,
GUARDIAN UK, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/apr/22/ali-glibel-win; see also Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *4–
5 (noting that HBO had settled for $40,000 in 2004 and settled for $50,000 in 2006).
4.
Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1576 (1996)
(“Frivolous claims often yield nuisance settlements, which represent nothing more than the
nuisance value of the suit—the expense, harassment, and embarrassment that the defendant may
endure in defending the suit. These nuisance settlements provide enough of an incentive for
plaintiffs to pursue them and, therefore, for investors to invest in them.”).
5.
The California court described the skit in question as follows:
Ali G interviewed Gore Vidal (Vidal) regarding the United States
Constitution and Amendments thereto. In the course of that discussion, Ali G
referred to appellant by her full name, stating: “Ain’t it better sometimes, to
get rid of the whole thing rather than amend it [the Constitution]? Cos like
me used to go out with this bitch called [appellant’s name] and she used to
always trying [to] amend herself. Y’know, get her hair done in highlights, get
like tattoo done on her batty crease, y’know, have the whole thing shaved—
very nice but it didn’t make any more difference. She was still a minger and
so, y’know me had enough and once me got her pregnant me said alright,
laters, that is it. Ain’t it the same with the Constitution?” During the episode,
Ali G also stated that Vidal was a world famous hairstylist and that the
Constitution was written on two stone tablets with Moses’s involvement. In
other portions of the same episode Ali G stated that Denzel Washington lived
in George Washington’s former Mount Vernon home; that John Paul Jones
had no arms or legs; that the world is running out of gravity, which was
discovered by “Sir Isaac Newton-John” after shooting an apple from William
Tell’s head; that euthanasia means the killing of elderly people by youth in
Asia; and that Ali G’s face was added to Mount Rushmore.
Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *3–4. The court agreed
with the district court’s conclusion that “the statements could not reasonably be understood as
statements of fact.” Id. at *7.
6.
SDD Global Helps Win Unanimous California Appellate Victory in “Ali G” Libel
Case, SDD GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, http://www.sddglobal.com/legal-outsourcing-lpo-legalprocess-outsourcing-news.htm#Ali_G (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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U.S. attorney and ultimately granted by a Los Angeles judge. 7 The Indian
firm also drafted briefs defending the decision on appeal and won a
unanimous ruling sustaining the case’s dismissal. 8
The Ali G case demonstrates some of the complexities of legal
offshoring. Offshoring the defense in that case did not merely replace
domestic legal services with a lower-cost alternative elsewhere; instead, it
changed the nature of the defense entirely. It took a case that would likely
have been handled outside the court system through a nuisance settlement
and brought it within the formal adjudicatory system. As a result, the case
was decided on the merits and the decision is publicly available, potentially
discouraging further meritless claims.
While the Ali G case shows that international outsourcing can transform
individual lawsuits, it also demonstrates how outsourcing is quickly
becoming a part of mainstream legal practice. Clients who experiment with
outsourcing tend to continue their contracts and institutionalize the
practice. 9 SDD Global’s success in the Ali G litigation was one example of
this phenomenon, as it led to a longer term relationship between the
offshore firm and Sacha Baron Cohen’s onshore legal team. 10 Among other
work, the Indian firm researched local defamation and obscenity rulings of
jurisdictions in which the comedian planned to film scenes for the movie
Bruno. 11
Given the rapid growth of transnational legal outsourcing—and the large
cost-savings associated with that growth—it seems safe to say that
outsourcing is not going away anytime soon. The legal profession will have
to adapt to incorporate this new way of providing legal services. A number
of recent articles 12 and student notes 13 have looked at the ethical
7.
See id.; Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *1,
*6–8.
8.
See Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *1, *6–8;
SDD GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, supra note 6.
9.
Approximately 70% of outsourcing contracts are renewed after fulfillment of the
initial contract. Charles Christian, Rumpole of Mumbai—PwC LPO/Outsourcing Survey, THE
ORANGE RAG (Jan. 15, 2010, 3:57 PM), http://www.theorangerag.com/blog/_archives/
2010/1/15/4429192.html.
10. Interview with Sanjay Bhatia, Head of Operations, SDD Global (June 18, 2010).
11. Id.
12. Steven C. Bennett, The Ethics of Legal Outsourcing, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 479 (2009);
Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical and
Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 401
(2007); Carlo D’Angelo, Overseas Legal Outsourcing and the American Legal Profession:
Friend or “Flattener”?, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 167 (2008); Brandon James Fischer,
Outsourcing Legal Services, In-Sourcing Ethical Issues: An Examination of the Ethical
Considerations Arising From the Practice of Outsourcing Legal Services Abroad, 16 SW. J.
INT’L L. 451 (2010); James I. Ham, Ethical Considerations Relating to Outsourcing of Legal
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implications of international outsourcing, addressing issues such as the
supervision of foreign legal professionals, confidentiality, and competence.
But very little research has been done into how socioeconomics,
organizational structure and social psychology influence lawyers in the
outsourcing process as they attempt to comply with these duties. 14 The
organizational setting is important, however; research has repeatedly shown
that the social and organizational factors significantly influence behavior. 15
This article seeks to bridge that gap in the literature by analyzing legal
outsourcing through the lens of organizational and socioeconomic theory
and by giving attention to situational influences affecting the outsourcing
process. This analysis can shed light on the practices and structures needed
to ensure compliance with ethical duties in the outsourcing context.
Part I examines the current—and rapidly developing—practice of
international contracting for legal services. In it, I examine the financial
incentives that led to the growth of legal outsourcing, the mechanics of the
outsourcing process, and the current level of client satisfaction.
Part II offers an overview of standard theories from economics,
organizational behavior, and social psychology. It explains how these
theories illuminate parties’ differing incentives in the contracting process.
Understanding how parties react to different incentives—at both a rational
Services by Law Firms to Foreign Service Providers: Perspectives from the United States, 27
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 323 (2008); Aaron R. Harmon, The Ethics of Legal Process
Outsourcing—Is the Practice of Law a “Noble Profession,” or Is It Just Another Business?, 13
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 41 (2008); Lee A. Patterson, Outsourcing of Legal Services: A Brief Survey
of the Practice and the Minimal Impact of Protectionist Legislation, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
BUS. 177 (2008); Mark L. Tuft, Supervising Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a Global
Environment: Re-Examining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 825 (2010).
13. Jose A. Arambulo, Comment, O Where, O Where Has My Legal Job Gone?:
Examining the Realities of “Offshoring” Legal Work and Why States Can Regulate the Practice
Despite Congress’ Broad Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause¸ 38 SW. L. REV. 195
(2008); Joshua A. Bachrach, Note, Offshore Legal Outsourcing and Risk Management:
Proposing Prospective Limitation of Liability Agreements Under Model Rule 1.8(H), 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 631 (2008); Alexandra Hanson, Comment, Legal Process Outsourcing to India:
So Hot Right Now!, 62 SMU L. REV. 1889 (2009); Courtney I. Schultz, Note, Legal Offshoring:
A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 35 J. CORP. L. 639 (2010); Keith Weffinden, Comment, Surfing the
Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending Domestic Legal Work to Foreign Countries
Under New York City Opinion 2006-3, 2007 BYU L. REV. 483 (2007).
14. One notable exception is Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains
and Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137,
2184 (2010) (examining the economic theory behind disaggregation of legal services and
analyzing empirical work on outsourcing, both across industries and within the legal
profession).
15. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129,
154 (2003).
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level and at an unconscious psychological level—can help predict where
risks will arise in the process.
Part III looks beyond the contracting process to examine the situational
context of outsourcing arrangements and identify risks that arise from gaps
in the allocation of responsibility or from cultural misunderstandings. It
looks at the most common models for allocating responsibility within the
outsourcing relationship, and it examines how the employment conditions
of outsourcing professionals influence the quality of legal services rendered.
It also analyzes cultural and status barriers that can impair the effectiveness
of the outsourcing relationship.
Finally, Part IV recommends a shift in framework from an outsourcing
model of disaggregation to one of collaboration. Under a traditional
disaggregation model, each participant is expected to work autonomously,
thus leaving significant gaps in the chain of responsibility and incentives for
opportunistic behavior. Under the collaborative model I propose, by
contrast, participants would actively focus on cooperation, communication,
and negotiation of status and resources. This collaborative focus would help
close the gaps in the chain of responsibility, facilitating compliance with
ethical duties and improving the quality of the legal services rendered.
I.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF LEGAL OFFSHORING

Because legal offshoring is such a new part of the legal services
landscape, it is unfamiliar to most Americans—even to most lawyers. They
may have trouble picturing how the offshoring arrangements are made and
how the work is actually done. And indeed, the answers to both of these
questions are rapidly changing and differ significantly depending on who is
sending the work and who is contracting to perform it. Nevertheless, it is
possible to get a sense of how the process works in general and some of the
various options available to parties seeking to take advantage of offshoring
arrangements. This section provides an overview of current international
outsourcing practices, examining who sends legal work offshore, what types
of legal work are sent, and the perceived benefits and detriments of this
global labor arbitrage.
A.

The Genesis of Legal Process Outsourcing

Transnational legal process outsourcing grew out of more general
business and information technology outsourcing. Information technology
outsourcing, especially to India, grew dramatically in the 1990s. Companies
needed to retrofit their software to avoid the so-called “millennium bug” or

6
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“Y2K problem,” in order to avoid software failures from failing to program
dates with a four-digit year. 16 United States companies ultimately spent
around $100 billion preparing for Y2K. 17 Given the huge expense of rewriting the software code, many companies looked for ways to save
money. 18 India proved to have capable, low-cost programmers and software
professionals who could do the work quickly, and the growth of the Internet
and communications technologies in the 1990s made it possible to
collaborate globally on software projects. 19 As a result, Indian firms booked
billions of dollars in business from American companies. 20
After the turn of the millennium, global outsourcing did not end—
instead, it picked up steam. 21 The success of the Y2K efforts established a
paradigm for international collaboration. It was a classic example of a
“temporary economic shock that produces a permanent change.” 22
Based on the success of the software model, firms began outsourcing
other types of work to India. Technology firms in particular began to
outsource more general business, seeing a growth in what was called
“business process outsourcing” or “BPO.” 23 The “process” in the phrase
refers to the idea “there is delegation of ‘control over the process’ which
implies that the supplier becomes the ‘owner of the business process.’” 24
Typical business process outsourcing might include payroll processing or
employee benefits management. 25
Soon, businesses began to offshore ever-more-complex processes. Those
requiring the greatest expertise and skill were known as “knowledge
process outsourcing” or “KPO.” 26 So, for example, while BPO might
require a vendor to perform data entry of insurance claims forms, KPO
might require the vendor to “evaluate new insurance applications based on a

16. Farhad Manjoo, Apocalypse Then: Was Y2K a Waste?, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/id/ 2235357/entry/2235359.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. SHASHI SHEKHAR PANDEY, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGAL PROCESS OUTSOURCING
6–7 (2009).
24. Id. at 6.
25. BPO—What
Is
Business
Process
Outsourcing?,
SOURCINGMAG.COM,
http://www.sourcingmag.com/content/what_is_bpo.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
26. Id.
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set of criteria or business rules.” 27 Technology has brought outsourcing
options even to specialized fields such as medicine 28 and law.
Legal process outsourcing, or “LPO,” arose from KPO and operates as a
specialized form of KPO occurring in the legal field. 29 It benefited from
fortuitous timing and the intersection of two trends. Just as technological
and business outsourcing grew in the past two decades, the legal field
changed at the same time, as law firms and clients began to rely more and
more on temporary and contract workers. 30 Legal work was increasingly
outsourced onshore to staffing agencies or to specialized e-discovery
agencies. 31 Offshore outsourcing combined these trends, taking work that
might have been given to a temporary attorney or an e-discovery vendor,
and sending it to be performed abroad.
B.

The Variety of Legal Offshoring Work

Just as the millennium bug sparked an increase in technology offshoring,
the “Great Recession” beginning in 2008 sparked a significant increase in
the offshoring of legal work, pushing both clients and law firms to consider
sending more legal work abroad. 32 After the ABA and a number of state and
local bar associations issued opinions approving the practice, legal
offshoring grew even faster. 33
27. Id.
28. See Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, The Unconstitutionality of Current Legal Barriers to
Telemedicine in the United States: Analysis and Future Directions of Its Relationship to
National and International Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2011).
29. Abdul Latheef Naha, It’s India for Legal Services, THE HINDU (Nov. 26, 2007),
http://www.hindu.com/edu/2007/11/26/stories/2007112650610300.htm (“LPO is part of highend knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) . . . .”).
30. Michael D. Goldhaber, Tempting Work: Contract Lawyers Are Growing in Numbers
As Well As Status, 156 N.J. L.J. 469 (1999) (“Lawyer temping came into its own after the
recession of the early ‘90s, when firms got burned by overhiring associates and the market
brimmed with unemployed lawyers.”).
31. See, e.g., Amy Miller, UPS’s Legal Department Brainstorms a Package Deal to Save
a Parcel of $$$, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.law.com/
jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202435291170&hubType=Top%20Story&UPSs_Legal_Dept_Bra
instorms_a_Package_Deal_to_Save_a_Parcel_of_ (noting that UPS has hired King & Spaulding
to coordinate its e-discovery, including managing contracts with staffing agencies and ediscovery vendors).
32. D’Angelo, supra note 12, at 189; Mike Dolan & John Thickett, The Financial Crisis:
How Can Corporate Legal Departments and Law Firms Manage the Aftermath?, ANDREWS FIN.
CRISIS LITIG. REP., Nov. 25, 2008.
33. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion 08-451] (discussing lawyers’ obligations when outsourcing legal and
nonlegal support services), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/
IC100123/relatedresources/opinion8-451.pdf; Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm’rs on
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The type of legal work sent offshore is both varied and changing
rapidly. 34 In general, approximately fifteen percent of LPO professionals
were performing work equivalent to a junior attorney, and approximately
eighty-five percent were performing work equivalent to what a paralegal or
administrative support professional might do in the United States. 35 For
intellectual property work, however, the trend has shifted to include
offshoring of more high-end work; in this area, “more than 50% of the
[offshored] work is high end.” 36 The percentage of work involving highlevel outsourcing is likely to continue to grow in other areas of the law. 37
In terms of administrative support, outsourcing professionals perform
low-level legal work, such as filling out legal forms like summonses,
warrants, or bankruptcy forms, and transcribing depositions. 38 Much
outsourced legal-administrative work relates either to the discovery process,
Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2009-6 (2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/index/o.asp; Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 121 (2009)
(discussing use of temporary lawyers and other professionals not admitted to practice in
Colorado (“outsourcing”)), available at http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/
25320/CETH/; Prof’l. Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Formal Op. 07-2 (2008), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/b2b76d49e9fd64a5852570050067a7af/792dd018996
bf2498525749400624f7a!OpenDocument; N.C. St. Bar, 2007 Formal Ethics Op. 12 (2008)
(discussing outsourcing legal support services), available at http://www.osqs.com/images/
Resourcespages/barethics/NC%202007%20Formal%20Ethics%20Opinion%2012.pdf;
San
Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 2007-1 (2007), available at http://cobralegalsolutions.com/
pdf/San%20Diego%20County%20Bar%20Association.pdf; L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 518 (2006), available at http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?
pageid=427; N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-3 (2006), available
at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2006.htm. The ABA subsequently drafted a more in-depth
report on domestic and offshore outsourcing. See ABA, ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20
DISCUSSION DRAFT, 10–15 (2010) [hereinafter ABA Discussion Draft], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/pdfs/discussion_draft.authch
eckdam.pdf.
34. See Keith Ecker, The Offshore Option, INSIDE COUNSEL, Jan. 2009, at 41.
35. Kian Ganz, India LPO Inc Headcounts to Triple as 15% of Work at US/UK Associate
Level, LEGALLY INDIA (May 6, 2010), http://www.legallyindia.com/20100506778/LegalProcess-Outsourcing-LPO/india-lpo-inc-headcounts-to-triple-as-15-of-work-usuk-associatelevel. The “85%” figure most likely includes document review.
36. Evalueserve, LPO and the Great Recession, IP FRONTLINE (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=24227&deptid=3.
37. The Economist has noted that although low-level outsourcing activities currently
dominate the Indian market, high-level activities are growing rapidly. See Passage to India,
ECONOMIST, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16439006?
story_id=16439006&source=hptextfeature (“Although still dominated by low-value process
outsourcing, such as call-centres, the fastest growth is in companies offering highly skilled
work, from medicine to engineering and information technology (IT).”).
38. Rosemary Ambale, What Do I Need to Join an LPO?, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS
SIDE OF THE POND (Jan. 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/
2009/01/what-do-i-need-to-join-lpo.html.
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to intellectual property work, or to contract management. 39 As a result, tasks
such as document review, coding, contract review, and management of
contracts databases are often sent offshore. 40
In terms of more complex legal work, foreign attorneys perform legal
research support, including “multijurisdictional surveys of state and local
case laws, statutes, ordinances, and regulations,” in addition to providing
assistance in brief writing and analysis of statutory and case law, citation
checking, document drafting, and preparing drafts of patent applications. 41
While this higher-level legal work represents only fifteen percent of the
LPO market right now, it is quickly growing; as LPO firms become more
established, they tend to take on increasingly more sophisticated work. 42
And although the more complex LPO work is typically performed for large
corporations who are sophisticated consumers of legal advice, some LPOs
will even offer their assistance to pro se litigants in the United States. 43

39. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 766 (2010)
(“[L]egal outsourcing currently focuses on the commodity end of legal work, including risk
management, contract review, and patent searches, rather than the sophisticated transactional
work that is Big Law’s comparative advantage”); see also PANDEY, supra note 23, at 11–12;
Ambale, supra note 38.
40. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 11–12; Ambale, supra note 38.
41. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 11–12.
42. Jordan Furlong, The Blind Side, SLAW (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.slaw.ca/
2010/04/03/the-blind-side/ (“LPOs, it has to be emphasized, are not just doing first-year
associates’ grunt work, not anymore. They are moving up the value chain steadily and with
surprising speed, taking on the work of second-, third- and fourth-year lawyers—not just by
using lower-cost labour, but by doing the work more systematically and efficiently.”). But see
Ron Friedmann, LPO as a Driver of Law Firm Innovation, INTEGREON (July 27, 2010),
http://www.integreon.com/blog/2010/07/lpo-as-a-driver-of-law-firm-innovation.html
(noting
that at Integreon, “We do not practice law nor is that part of our corporate strategy. So we see a
clear limit to how far ‘up the value chain’ an LPO can go before it practices law and is therefore
no longer an LPO.”).
43. Legal Outsourcing in California Helps Hollywood Win Cases, SDD GLOBAL
SOLUTIONS, http://www.sddglobal.com/legal-process-outsourcing-in-California.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2011) (noting that “clients include production companies, film studios, corporations,
solo practitioners, law firms, training institutions, individuals and pro se litigants in
California”). The pro se client who hired SDD Global was himself a licensed attorney in
California who sought assistance from the firm. Other firms, however, may work directly with
non-lawyer pro se litigants. See Brent Howard, Testimonials, SUNLEXIS,
http://www.sunlexis.com/testimonials.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (containing a client
testimonial stating: “I am a Pro Se litigant in a case against the State of Nevada local
government. . . . I found SunLexis through the internet and in a little over two week they read
my complaint, their motion to dismiss, my draft of a response and did amazing research.”).
Others have theorized that technological innovation may shift the boundaries of regulated law
practice. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69
MO. L. REV. 299, 324 (2004) (“[T]he fact that Internet law practice can provide effective legal
assistance on routine matters to a low-income clientele makes opposition by the ABA politically
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While the types of legal services that LPOs perform are very broad, they
are not without limit entirely: state law in the United States prohibits nonstate-licensed individuals from “the practice of law.” 44 Indian law likewise
prohibits foreign-owned LPOs from practicing law in India. 45 The definition
of practicing law is broader in the United States than it is in India, however.
In the United States, legal advice is included within the ambit of legal
practice, whereas Indian law typically considers the practice of law as
“appearance before any court, tribunal, or similar authority.” 46 Historically
in India, the practice of law was thought to exclude “legal advice,
documentation or seeking alternative routes for dispute-resolution,” 47
though recently the Mumbai High Court has ruled that the term “practice of
law” under Section 29 of the Indian Advocates Act is “wide enough to
cover” legal practice “in non litigious matters.” 48 Even under the broader
U.S. definition, however, most jurisdictions allow legal work to be
delegated to non-lawyers as long as a U.S.-licensed attorney takes ultimate
responsibility for the legal work. 49
Legal work is offshored to a number of countries, including China, the
Philippines, and Sri Lanka, 50 but India is by far the most common
destination. Indian revenue from legal process outsourcing (LPO) was
valued at $320 million in 2008, and expected to grow to $640 million by
2015; 51 80% of this revenue comes from U.S. clients, while the remainder
comes from other counties such as Australia and the U.K. 52 Work is
performed by Indian attorneys who have graduated from the top law schools
unattractive. In general, these new business methods demand a clearer theory of the appropriate
scope of regulation than is provided by the existing analytical framework.”).
44. See Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 427–30.
45. Lawyers Collective v. Ashurst, (2009) W.P. No. 1526/1995 (India), available at
http://www.barandbench.com/userfiles/files/File/Lawyers%20Collective%20foreign%20firms%
20Bbay%20HC.pdf.
46. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 63.
47. Id.
48. Lawyers Collective, at ¶ 60.
49. See Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 429–30 (“Lawyers are punished only when their
failure to supervise their employees facilitates the employees’ UPL activities or when the
lawyers deliberately assist the UPL activities of affiliated organizations. . . . [L]aw firms, in
deciding to offshore legal services, likely face few, if any, UPL hurdles as a practical matter.”).
50. Christian, supra note 9; see also American Discovery, About Us,
http://www.americandiscovery.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (offering discovery
support services from the Philippines).
51. Viren Naidu, LPO In India Is Expected to Lead the Offshore Field In the Next ThreeFive Years, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
opinion/interviews/lpo-in-india-is-expected-to-lead-the-offshore-field-in-the-next-three-fiveyears/articleshow/5800286.cms.
52. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 96.
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in India. 53 These law schools provide common-law legal instruction
conducted primarily in English. 54 Thus, even though the Indian attorneys
may be working with foreign law, the legal systems are similar enough that
the attorneys transition relatively easily. In fact, as one LPO manager noted,
Indian attorneys employed by LPOs sometimes have greater familiarity
with U.S. law than they do with Indian law:
Training young lawyers in an LPO firm, I was amazed to find that
they knew more about US and UK laws than the laws in India.
They could tell me about euthanasia provisions for animals in the
UK but had no idea if similar provisions existed in India. They
knew all about insurance law in the US, but asked if we have
anything like this here, they were unsure. 55

C.

The Financial and Mechanical Aspects of Outsourcing

Legal process outsourcing results in monetary savings for the law firms
and companies who engage in it. The cost savings are significant. One inhouse attorney reported asking for quotes for customizing a residential lease

53. Interviews with Kevin Colangelo, Pangea3, and Sanjay Bhatia, SDD Global (noting
that their LPO firms hire only from the top schools). But see also Mark Ross, Is Everything
What It Seems in the India Offshore Legal Outsourcing Space?, LEGAL PROCESS OUTSOURCING
(Aug. 16, 2007, 10:20 AM), http://blog.law-scribe.com/2007/08/is-everything-what-it-seems-inindia.html (noting that “legal process outsourcing companies, law firm captives and Western
companies with their own captive arrangements in India all maintain that they only hire the
most highly qualified candidates from the best law schools in India” but expressing doubt that
“everyone can be telling the truth” about hiring only the most qualified graduates). However, at
this time, the number of attorneys working in LPOs is still a tiny fraction of the law graduates in
India. There are more than one million law graduates in India, with only an estimated 7,500 to
32,000 working in LPOs. Therefore, it seems quite possible that LPOs can afford to hire only
top graduates at this time, though that may change in the future as the industry continues to
expand at current rates. See id.; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 57, 61 (2010).
54. See Marc Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the Good
Lawyer, and the American Law School, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 292, 293 (1986) (noting that the
Indian legal system “operates in English”). But see Laura D’Allaird, “The Indian Lawyer”:
Legal Education in India and Protecting the Duty of Confidentiality While Outsourcing, 18
PROF. LAW. 1, 6, 12 n.70 (2007) (noting that “even though legal education was officially
mandated in English due to English being the official language of India,” some language
difficulties persist).
55. Rosemary Ambale, Quality in LPOs, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS SIDE OF THE POND
(Nov. 19, 2009, 7:06 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/2009/11/quality-inlpos.html.
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in each of the fifty states. 56 The company’s law firm offered to do it for
$400,000; an Indian LPO firm offered to do it for $45,000. 57 The company’s
chief operating officer chose to outsource. 58 Much of the savings come from
an enormous salary differential: an LPO salary for an Indian attorney is
approximately $10,000—or 1/16 of the $160,000 base salary earned by a
first-year associate at a large U.S. law firm. 59 Similarly, for higher level
contract drafting and legal research, the difference may be $400 an hour for
a London-based attorney versus $50 an hour for a Gurgaon-based
attorney. 60
Mechanically, parties outsource in two primary ways. 61 The first way,
adopted primarily by very large corporations, is to establish a “captive
center”—essentially, an offshore branch of the company in a lower-cost
location. 62 General Electric adopted this strategy in 2005, employing thirty
Indian lawyers to support the corporation’s legal work. 63 Currently,
approximately fifteen large corporations have established such centers. 64
The second and more common way of outsourcing is to hire a “third party
LPO service provider.” 65 Major providers include Pangea3, Clutch Group,
Integreon, and CPA Global.
Interestingly, even though many of the ethics opinions and legal
scholarship dealing with outsourcing seem to assume that law firms will be
the ones leading the way, this is not the case. 66 Instead, it is corporations in
need of legal services—rather than the law firms that have traditionally
provided that service—that so far have taken the lead in sending work
56. Cynthia Cotts & Liane Kufchock, Jones Day, Kirkland Send Work to India to Cut
Costs, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2007, 4:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601103&sid=aBo8DnfekWZQ.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Anthony Lin, Legal Outsourcing to India Is Growing, But Still Confronts
Fundamental Issues, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 2008; see also Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is
Flat: Globalization and Its Effect on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 527, 537 (2008) (“LPO salaries for Indian lawyers are generally well below $10,000
a year. By comparison, a U.S. contract lawyer usually earns around $30 an hour while associate
base salaries at major firms in New York start at $160,000 a year.”).
60. Passage to India, supra note 37.
61. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2189, 2195 n.16, 2201–02 (2007) (discussing additional outsourcing methods,
including U.S. companies who hire Indian law firms and hiring U.S.-licensed attorneys who
work abroad).
62. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 46.
63. Id.
64. Ganz, supra note 35.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 12, at 476 (advocating a new ABA rule requiring lawyers
to disclose international outsourcing arrangements to clients).
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offshore. 67 Companies’ outside law firms may participate in the process of
offshoring if their clients demand it, but most law firms are unlikely to
initiate it without client participation. 68 The few law firms who do initiate
outsourcing arrangements are more likely to be plaintiffs’ firms working on
contingency fees. 69 When attorneys bill hourly, savings from outsourcing
accrue to the client; but when attorneys contract for a percentage of the
recovery, savings from outsourcing can accrue to the attorney.
Corporations choosing to send work offshore will rarely publicly
announce that they are doing so. 70 First, there is a risk that competitors will
follow suit, thus diminishing any competitive advantage gained from
outsourcing. 71 Second, there is also a risk that the outsourcing company will
be punished in the marketplace by U.S. residents politically opposed to
outsourcing in general. 72 However, a few large corporations have been
willing to go public about their offshoring practices. Microsoft, for
example, revealed that it spent $3 million in 2008 on patent LPO services in
67. Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 414 (quoting an outsourcing manager as saying that
“[c]orporate law departments . . . are much more apt [than law firms] to make use of outsourced
legal staff, often because other corporate divisions also have cut costs through outsourcing”);
see Evalueserve, supra note 36 (“More than 90% of the LPO work is either being directly
outsourced by Corporate Counsels or on behalf of Corporate Counsels (by their preferred law
firms).”).
68. See, e.g., Cotts & Kufchock, supra note 56 (quoting David Perla, co-chief executive of
a major outsourcing provider: “Some firms are coming to us because in-house clients suggested
it or pressured them. . . . Others want to come to the client first and offer a solution.”); see also
Kit Chellel, Slaughters in Talks Over Outsourcing Plans, THE LAWYER, Oct. 5, 2009, at 1
(discussing mounting client pressure to outsource, causing top firms in England to send legal
work offshore).
69. FIRST RESEARCH, INDUSTRY PROFILE: LEGAL SERVICES (2009), available at
http://www.tba.org/benefits/FirstResearch-LegalServices.pdf (“Some law firms, especially
contingency firms, cut costs by outsourcing legal processes overseas.”).
70. George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96
VA. L. REV. 241, 243 (2010); see also Press Release, PRLog, Wall of Silence Surrounds
Emerging
Legal
Outsourcing
Industry
(July
7,
2010),
available
at
http://www.prlog.org/10781658-wall-of-silence-surrounds-emerging-legal-outsourcingindustry.html (“In a Fronterion survey of 30 top US firms in the Am Law 50, some 83 percent
declined to comment on whether they had used legal process outsourcing (LPO) providers,
despite the fact that responses were confidential.”).
71. Geis, supra note 70, at 243. But see Rees Morrison, To What Degree Do General
Counsel Hoard Their Management Innovations and Not Share Them with Others, Especially
BLOG
(Dec.
31,
2010,
9:12
AM),
Competitors?,
LAW DEP’T MGMT.
http://www.lawdepartmentmanagementblog.com/law_department_management/2010/12/towhat-degree-do-general-counsel-hoard-their-management-innovations-and-not-share-themwith-others-especially-competitors.html (“It has not been my impression that general counsel
conceal their management efforts and experiences from each other because of a concern for
proprietary value or a competitive edge. When general counsel talk among themselves in trade
groups or at other gatherings, they seem willing to share openly and completely.”).
72. Id.
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India, including prior art searches, invalidity searches, and project
mapping—work that would have cost it $9.5 million in the United States. 73
International outsourcing is often publicly criticized as eliminating U.S.
jobs. 74 It can be difficult to estimate the actual impact of offshoring on U.S.
employment. Although some assume that outsourcing results in one-to-one
impact where one U.S. job is lost for every job sent offshore, 75 this is not
actually the case: instead, the process of offshoring can lead to higher global
employment overall. 76 Because outsourcing allows services to be provided
at lower costs, it allows consumers of those services to purchase more
services than they otherwise would, thereby “slowly chang[ing] client
behavior.” 77 Just as the introduction of low-cost European airlines allowed
customers in Europe to “now think nothing of going abroad for the
weekend, or even of commuting to another country for the workweek,”
outsourcing can similarly increase the services demanded in new areas. 78
This effect almost certainly carries over into the legal field, as offshoring
creates the ability to pursue and/or defend more claims than could otherwise
be litigated affordably. If not for outsourcing, the Ali G litigation might
have settled instead of going to court. Likewise, at least one high-profile
criminal defendant, Denis Field, the former Chairman and CEO of the
73. CPA GLOBAL, OUTSOURCING AS A BUSINESS MODEL, available at
http://www.cpaglobal.com/ sites/default/files/2008_microsoft_case_study.pdf (last visited Mar.
15, 2010).
74. See, e.g., Andrew S. Ross, Obama Riles High-Tech Exec Over Outsourcing, S.F. GATE
(May 5, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-05-05/business/17201203_1_international-taxdla-piper-cisco-systems (noting that “President Obama promis[ed] to end overseas tax breaks
for U.S. companies that ‘create a job in Bangalore, India, (rather than) one in Buffalo, N.Y.’”).
75. See, e.g., Krishnan, supra note 61, at 2206 n.81 (noting that one study estimated that
79,000 people will be employed in the legal outsourcing field in India but that only 40,400 U.S.
attorneys will lose their jobs, and concluding that the estimate “ostensibly mean[s] that the
remaining ‘legal’ jobs outsourced will be paralegal and more secretarial in nature”). While
many legal outsourcing firms do indeed employ Indian attorneys to perform paralegal and
secretarial work, an alternative interpretation of the data is simply that offshoring will increase
the amount of legal work performed, thus employing more Indian attorneys.
76. A McKinsey report estimated that every $1 spent on offshoring by U.S. companies
created “US$1.45–1.47 of value to the global economy, with the USA capturing US$1.12–1.14
and the receiving country capturing on average 33 cents.” MARK KOBAYASHI-HILLARY &
RICHARD SYKES, GLOBAL SERVICES: MOVING TO A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 124 (2007). Thus,
higher global employment levels may arise from an increase in the global economy as well as
from lower salary costs offshore. See also Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya & T.N.
Srinivasan, The Muddles Over Outsourcing, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 99 (2004) (“[E]ven if
outsourcing sometimes reduces jobs proximately at certain firms or in certain sectors, in other
cases it can help to create new U.S. jobs.”).
77. Innovators at the Barricades, ADAM SMITH ESQ. (July 19, 2010, 10:50 PM),
http://www.adamsmithesq.com/archives/2010/07/innovators-at-the-barricades.html.
78. Id.
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accounting firm BDO Seidman, has hired an Indian firm to provide
additional research and drafting services in the defense of his tax-shelter
prosecution—services that he could not afford at typical U.S. rates. 79 Thus,
on the whole, offshoring likely creates more jobs than it eliminates. 80
Futhermore, the cost savings achieved from offshoring lower-level work
may create more high-end jobs onshore. 81
Just as outsourcing may create new jobs domestically rather than merely
transitioning work abroad, the financial benefits of outsourcing are also felt
both onshore and off. 82 Generally, researchers have found that seventy to
eighty percent of the economic benefits from offshoring remain with the
country sending work offshore—only twenty to thirty percent accrue to the
country accepting the work. 83 From the client’s perspective, legal
outsourcing is likely to create similar economic gain, as lower legal costs
allow companies to reinvest savings into production and profit.
While legal offshoring may result in a net economic gain, particular
subsets of U.S. attorneys have been detrimentally affected by the trend. 84
Junior attorneys and contract attorneys who work as temporary employees
have seen wages decline as corporate clients press for ever-lower rates. 85
Much of the work that is currently subject to outsourcing—including
document review and basic legal research—is work that junior attorneys in

79. Vidya Devaiah, Embattled Ex-Head of 5th Largest Accounting Firm Turns to Indian
Legal Outsourcing, LAW WITHOUT BORDERS (July 7, 2010), http://lawwithoutborders.
typepad.com/legaloutsourcing/2010/07/denis-field-hires-indian-legal-outsourcing-companyembattled-exchairmanceo-of-fifth-largest-accounti.html.
80. Outsourcing Creates Jobs, Study Says, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 30, 2004),
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/30/news/economy/outsourcing/index.htm.
81. Larry E. Ribstein, Where Have All the Lawyers Gone, FORBES, Aug. 8, 2010 (“The
legal services industry will soon look very different from what we’re used to. While there will
always be a need for high-end legal talent, wage workers and machines will be able to do much
of the rest of the rest [sic] of what is now law practice. On the positive side, lawyers will meet a
better fate than the soldiers in Pete Seeger’s song: gone to India, or to jobs that are more worthy
of their talents than the more routine types of law practice today.”).
82. Bhagwati, Panagariya & Srinivasan, supra note 76, at 99 (explaining that because
outsourcing can make new projects financially viable, those projects can lead to increased
employment both domestically and overseas). In one case, for example, an engineering project
“seemed financially nonviable” in the absence of outsourcing. Id. With outsourcing, however,
the project became viable, and “[f]or each engineer in India, the firm now employees six
engineers in the United States.” Id.
83. KOBAYASHI-HILLARY & SYKES, supra note 76, at 91.
84. Michael G. Owen, Legal Outsourcing to India: The Demise of New Lawyers and
Junior Associates, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 175, 188 (2008).
85. Julie Kay, Contract Lawyers: Cheaper by the Hour: Use of Contract Attorneys Grows,
As Do the Complaints, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 12, 2009.
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the United States would typically perform. 86 Furthermore, in other
industries, individuals whose jobs were lost to globalization did not recover
economically in the long term. 87 To young attorneys displaced by
globalization, the creation of jobs in foreign countries and rising corporate
profits may be of little consolation. 88
D.

Quality and Satisfaction in Legal Offshoring

Clients generally report satisfaction with their offshoring effort.
Approximately seventy percent of outsourcing deals in general are renewed
after the expiration of the first contract, suggesting that most outsourcing
clients are satisfied both with offshoring practices in general, as well as
satisfied with the particular vendors supplying the work. 89 With regard to
legal outsourcing in particular, a recent survey of offshoring clients—both
corporations and law firms—reported that only 7.7% of U.S. law firms and
6.8% of corporations experienced “strong dissatisfaction” with their
offshoring experiences. 90 Thus, it seems likely that LPO clients will engage
in ongoing outsourcing relationships as their counterparts in other industries
have done.
In general, companies report that LPO vendors provide high quality
services. 91 An attorney from Baker McKenzie conducted a comparison of
first-level document review at onshore and offshore locations, comparing
cost, quality, learning curve, and productivity. 92 The attorney concluded that
the Indian LPO ranked better on cost, slightly worse on length of the
learning curve, and ranked comparably on quality and productivity. 93 David
Perla, co-founder of Pangea3, also had clients conduct “bake-offs” where
86. Owen, supra note 84, at 189 (noting that junior attorneys will lack opportunities for
training when low-level work is outsourced).
87. Srinivas Durvasula & Steven Lysonski, How Offshore Outsourcing Is Perceived: Why
Do Some Consumers Feel More Threatened?, 21 J. INT’L CONSUMER MKTG. 17, 29 (2009)
(“The Bureau of Labor Statistics found that of those whose jobs were displaced by overseas
trade from 1979 to 1999, 31 percent were not fully reemployed and 55 percent were making 85
percent or less than their former wages.”).
88. See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Outsourcing to India Draws Western Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010 (reporting “hostility toward the practice” of offshoring from junior
associates).
89. Christian, supra note 9.
90. Report: Key Findings From Legal Process Outsourcing Survey, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb.
2, 2010.
91. Lin, supra note 59; Gavin Birer, The Results are in and the Winner Is . . . , SLAW (Apr.
20, 2009), http://www.slaw.ca/2009/04/20/the-results-are-in-and-the-winner-is%E2%80%A6/.
92. Birer, supra note 91.
93. Id.
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they compared the results of document review completed by Indian
attorneys and by U.S. contract attorneys. 94 Clients found that the Indian
teams “soundly trounced” the Americans. 95
Again, however, there are some reports of dissatisfaction. For example,
one U.S. company ended its practice of offshoring deposition summaries
after it spent too much time changing British-English idioms into American
English; the company reported that the Indian employees “would use words
like ‘fortnight’ (to describe a two-week period) and ‘bonnet’ (for the hood
of a car).” 96 The company also found quality to be inconsistent, with some
deposition summaries being excellent, and others being unacceptable. 97
Others have noted that many LPO applicants may not have the precise
technical and legal vocabulary to succeed in providing legal support
services for Western attorneys. 98
94. Lin, supra note 59.
95. Id.
96. Petra Pasternak, When Outsourcing Proves Too Expensive, Bring It on Home, LEGAL
PAD (May 17, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://legalpad.typepad.com/my_weblog/2010/05/whenoutsourcing-proves-too-expensive-bring-it-on-home.html; see also Rosemary Ambale, Are
Indian Lawyers Turning into Clerks?, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS SIDE OF THE POND (Aug. 9,
2009, 4:21 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/2009/08/are-indian-lawyersturning-into-clerks.html (noting that some Indian attorneys may struggle with technical legal
English: “Not understanding the difference between ‘referring’ and ‘referral’, ‘consistent’ and
‘consisting’, ‘verily’ and ‘verify’, ‘at’ and ‘on’, can indeed, like Cleopatra’s nose, decide
fates.”).
97. Pasternak, supra note 96.
98. Excerpts from cover letters sent from job applicants included the following statements:
• “I went thru yr ad in job portal and am very much interested in offering
services to yr esteemed organ.”
• “Dear Responsible, I heared as a vacancy in your Organization for the
Legal Designation. The Organization may adobt me in yourself if I
eligible as a Employee.”
• “Respected sir/madam, i am interesting to join lpo job for hike of my
career in corporate legal firms . . . .”
• “sir, Here attached my resume for your vision if you have any suitable
job, please contact my mobile.”
• “DEAR MADAM/SIR, KINDLY CHECK MY CV IN ATTACHMENT
ALSO SUGGEST ME A LEGAL JOBBY WHICH I WILL LEARN
LOT LEGAL ACT.”
• “Res. sir, This application apply for the above subject matter of the Email. other description attached on the file attached. . . . And it was while
having the privilege to work for certain reputed corps. Of international
fame, I got a well fermented atmosphere to process in search of
reformative thesis to sooth the conduct of regulation of policy and
legislations which minimized the disputes to considerable limits . . . .”
Sanjay Bhatia, Starting Your Own LPO? Here’s How to Do It. And How Not to., LAW WITHOUT
BORDERS (July 16, 2010), http://lawwithoutborders.typepad.com/legaloutsourcing/2010/07/
starting-your-own-lpo-heres-how-to-do-it-and-how-not-to.html.
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Because of the possible risks of dissatisfaction, most LPO participants
recommend the clients begin outsourcing on a small scale at first: “No
matter how convinced a law firm is of the ability of an LPO to meet its
efficiency and due-diligence standards, prudence dictates that it test the
waters by sending out smaller jobs initially, and then graduate slowly to
larger ones.” 99 LPO firms are also taking additional measures to reduce the
dissatisfaction rate further, focusing on improving quality control by adding
additional levels of review, improving training programs, and integrating
teams of Indian and Western attorneys. 100
II.

SOCIOECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

Given that legal offshoring seems here to stay, participants in the
offshoring process must find ways to ensure that it is done effectively. Both
ethics opinions and legal scholars have stressed the need for outsourced
legal services to comply with the duties of competence, confidentiality, and
avoidance of conflicts of interest. Some have offered some concrete
suggestions. 101 But many questions remain. The ethics opinions are
unanimous that offshored legal work must still comply with ethical duties—
a licensed attorney must supervise the work, clients’ information must be
kept confidential, and the legal services must be competently rendered. 102
The opinions, however, give little guidance as to how the parties to the
outsourcing transaction should ensure that these duties are met.
Socioeconomic and organizational behavior theory can help shed light
on where problems in the outsourcing process are likely to arise and how
those problems can be minimized. This section focuses on outsourcing risks
that arise from the contracting process generally, given that each party to a

99. Rosemary Ambale, Obama and the Indian in the LPO, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS
SIDE OF THE POND (May 23, 2009, 10:17 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/
2009/05/obama-and-indian-in-lpo.html.
100. See E-mail from Sabyasachi Ghosh, Vice-President, Legal Operations, SKJ Legal
(June 7, 2010) (recommending a “2nd level QC [quality-control check] of the Indian LPO work
products by an American attorney, whether he is sitting in India or in the US, before the work
reaches the clients”); Interview with Kevin Colangelo, General Counsel and Vice President,
Legal Services, Pangea3 (June 9, 2010) (emphasizing the need for institutionalized training);
Bhatia, supra note 98.
101. See, e.g., Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 425–47 (recommending strategies to ensure
compliance with the rules of professional responsibility); see also ABA Opinion 08-451, supra
note 33 (recommending that lawyers involved in the outsourcing decision interview prospective
legal services providers, conduct reference checks on individual service providers, investigate
the security of LPO offices, and, in some cases, visit those offices personally).
102. See, e.g., ABA Opinion 08-451, supra note 33.
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contract has different interests. 103 It examines leading theories in both the
socioeconomic and organizational realms that have been applied to the
analysis of outsourcing decisions, and it explains how the theories interrelate in the outsourcing context. 104
A.

Socioeconomic Theory

Socioeconomic theory can help illuminate the costs and benefits of
outsourcing. Traditionally, scholars looking at outsourcing outside the legal
industry have applied an economic and strategic lens to the question of
“why and what” to outsource. 105 Such analysis is also helpful inside the
legal industry, where it can help predict where problems may arise and
suggest ways of addressing those problems.
This section sets out basic principles from three socioeconomic theories.
First, agency theory explains how the interests of a principal (here, the
client) and an agent (the service provider) may differ, creating risks of
opportunistic behavior. 106 Second, transaction cost theory builds on agency
theory to examine when the cost savings obtained from outsourcing are
sufficient to offset the control of keeping work in-house. 107 Finally, resource
dependence theory helps explain the conditions under which an agent will
be most responsive to the client’s needs. 108 Together, these theories shed
light on the different incentives driving each of the parties in the
outsourcing transaction.
1.

Agency Theory

Agency theory focuses on the relationship between the principal (in an
outsourcing arrangement, the client purchasing the outsourced service) and
the agent (the service vendor). 109 Agency theory posits that clients and
103. Other risks arise from the disaggregation of legal services into component parts and
from the possibility of cross cultural misunderstanding; the next section deals with these in
greater depth.
104. See Jens Dibbern et al., Information Systems Outsourcing: A Survey and Analysis of
the Literature, 35 ACM SIGMIS DATABASE 6 (2004) (conducting a literature review).
105. Id.
106. See infra Part II.A.1.
107. See infra Part II.A.2.
108. See infra Part II.A.3.
109. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84
VA. L. REV. 1707, 1735–38 (1998) (discussing agency theory in the context of law firm
employment); Ted Schneyer, Reputational Bonding, Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The
Economist as Storyteller, 84 VA. L. REV. 1777, 1793–94 (1998); see also Subrata Chakrabarty,
Real-Life Case Studies of Offshore Outsourced IS Projects: Analysis of Issues and Socio-
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vendors seek to fulfill different interests. 110 One of the main conflicting
interests is financial: for example, one recent outsourcing survey found that
clients expected an outsourcing contract to provide a five to twelve percent
profit margin to the service provider, while the service provider sought a
profit margin of fifteen to twenty-five percent. 111
Agency theory has long been a staple of legal practice generally, as
lawyers are expected to act as agents representing the client, though the
agency model does not explain the lawyer/client relationship entirely. 112 In a
legal outsourcing arrangement, the client’s two main interests are receiving
quality legal work and minimizing the cost associated with that work. 113 The
client may also value flexibility, including the ability to have legal support
when required, without needing to carry permanent employees on the
payroll. The vendor, on the other hand, has an interest in maximizing the
amount earned. 114 The vendor may also value stability over flexibility.
Because the vendor is likely to incur costs in recruiting and training the
workers, a stable workflow minimizes the costs associated with employee
turnover. These conflicting interests will be reconciled, though imperfectly,
by contract. 115 The client, who serves as the principal in the agency
relationship, and the vendor, who serves as the agent, allocate responsibility
in an attempt to allow both to maximize their interests.
Like other agency relationships, the client/vendor agreement creates
costs in excess of the client’s financial payments. 116 Total agency costs are

Economic Paradigms, in HARBHAJAN S. KEHAL & VARINDER P. SINGH, OUTSOURCING AND
OFFSHORING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 248, 272 (2006)
(discussing agency theory in the context of information-services outsourcing).
110. Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 252.
111. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, OUTSOURCING COMES OF AGE: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE PARTNERING 12 (2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/
operations-consulting-services/pdf/outsourcingcomesofage.pdf.
112. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2075 (2010) (noting that “[e]lite
lawyers never conceived of themselves . . . as ‘deferential servants’ who merely carry out the
client’s bidding”) (quoting ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (1993)).
113. See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 955, 1002–03 (2007) (noting that falling interaction costs can give rise to growth
in outsourcing, as “business activity is moved to low-cost markets,” but also arguing that
reduced monitoring costs may also be part of that equation, as clients may be better able to
control the quality of the final product, “mitigat[ing] the dark side of outsourcing”).
114. Id. at 992 (“The vendor has no incentive to tackle a project in a cost-effective manner
because she will be paid for shirking or other inefficient behavior.”).
115. Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 272.
116. See Geis, supra note 113, at 978 (“Outsourcing deals thus generate agency risk under a
very familiar logic: the entity that controls a business activity does not ultimately ‘own’ the
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said to equal the sum of the monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual
loss. 117 Monitoring costs fall upon the client who outsources work; the client
must monitor the quality of the work being done and the reasonableness of
the charges for that work. 118 Bonding costs, on the other hand, fall upon the
vendor performing the work. 119 Bonding costs are defined as expenditures
that the agent makes “to guarantee that the agent will not take certain
actions [which would] harm the principal,”—for example, the vendor may
purchase insurance or otherwise “create some pool of resources or a legal
obligation from which the principal can be compensated for detrimental
actions of the agent.” 120 Finally, residual losses arise from any remaining
disparity between the principal’s and agent’s interests that is not eliminated
by contract. 121
While agency theory has a long scholarly history, most researchers agree
that agency theory alone does not fully explain business decisions. Agency
theory has been criticized for a “narrow view of rationality” and,
specifically, its inattention to ethical norms. 122 However, agency theory
makes a strong contribution to understanding the differing interests and
incentives of each party in the relationship, and when combined with other
theories discussed below, can aid in understanding some of the risks that
arise in the outsourcing process.
2.

Transaction Cost Theory

Transaction cost theory, first developed by Ronald Coase, examines why
some activities are “executed across markets” whiles others “are

economic result . . . . Unless resources are spent on monitoring, bonding, or other contractual
protection, business outsourcing breeds a host of distorted incentives.”).
117. See Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 272; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[A]gency costs [are] the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by
the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual loss.” (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted)).
118. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 117, at 308.
119. Id.
120. Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 515, 538–39 (2007).
121. Id.
122. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 265, 277 (1998) (citing Daniel Levinthal, A Survey of Agency Models of
Organizations, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 153, 154 (1988)).
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internalized within the unitary firm.” 123 Given that the decision to outsource
involves that very question, it is not surprising that transaction cost theory
has frequently been applied to analyze outsourcing arrangements. 124
Transaction cost theory asserts that “coordination by exchange” on the
open market is the default position, and is “generally more efficient.” 125 But
when the market fails and transaction costs are high, then firms will
internalize the activity. 126 Firms are “less sensitive and responsive to
changes in price or demand” than market actors, but firms also possess
strong administrative controls to direct the activity and ensure results. 127
Thus, transaction cost theory suggests that a client will decide to
outsource—either on or off shore—when the savings gained from that
transaction outweigh the administrative control the client would retain by
keeping the service in-house. The question of how to measure these
transaction costs has given rise to a great deal of scholarship. 128 Transaction
costs include both the “direct costs of managing relationships and the
opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions,” 129 as well as “search
and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, [and] policing and
enforcement costs.” 130 These transaction costs have also been usefully
categorized as “coordination costs” which are “associated with collecting
and integrating information into the decision process” and “transaction risk”
costs “associated with the possibility that other parties will fail to meet their
contractual obligations due to opportunism.” 131
Regardless of how the transaction costs are categorized, they are held to
include the agency costs identified above, such as the cost of monitoring
performance, the increased cost of the contract from bonding activity, and
123. Jeffery Atik, Technology and Distribution as Organizational Elements Within
International Strategic Alliances, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 273, 282 (1993) (citing Ronald
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386 (1937)).
124. Dibbern et al., supra note 104, at 14 (noting that transaction cost theory is one of the
“main reference theory or theories embraced in the research articles” examining outsourcing).
125. Atik, supra note 123, at 286.
126. Id.
127. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2349 (2004).
128. George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 107
(2009).
129. Id. at 107 n.28 (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE
(1996); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES (1975)).
130. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979).
131. Jeff K. Stratman, Facilitating Offshoring with Enterprise Technologies: Reducing
Operational Friction in the Governance and Production of Services, 26 J. OPERATIONS MGMT.
275, 278 (2007).
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residual loss. In this way, transaction cost theory and agency theory can
work together to explain outsourcing decisions. Both theories are
“concerned with similar issues and appear to be moving toward even more
common conceptual ground.” 132 As a result, it is helpful to consider the
theories in conjunction; scholars have suggested that “blending constructs
and propositions from the two theories may further improve our
understanding of market[] phenomena.” 133
Just as agency theory has been criticized for its inattention to behavioral
and ethical considerations, transaction cost theory has been subject to
similar criticism. Specifically, researchers have argued that transaction cost
theory may fail in practice when “managers are incapable of implementing”
the rules of behavior upon which transaction cost theory depends. 134
However, while researchers have criticized transaction cost theory’s ability
to provide normative guidance, they agree that the theory has merit for
“descriptive and analytical purposes”—that is, it can help explain why
choices are made, even if it cannot effectively guide those choices at the
outset. 135 And indeed, in the outsourcing context, empirical study has found
“modest evidence” in support of transaction cost theory, noting that “parties
write contracts with more hierarchical governance features when a deal
involves complex business functions or imposes stricter barriers to exit.” 136
3.

Resource Dependence Theory

Resource dependence theory focuses on the environment of
organizations. 137 It examines firms within their external environments, and
examines their dependence on actors outside the firm for critical
resources. 138 The theory “argues that organizations are other-directed,
involved in a constant struggle for autonomy and discretion, confronted
with constraints and external control.” 139

132. Mark Bergen et al., Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications
and Applications of Agency and Related Theories, 56 J. MARKETING 1, 8 (1992).
133. Id.
134. Sumantra Ghoshal & Peter Moran, Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction
Cost Theory, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13, 16 (1996).
135. Id. at 40.
136. Geis, supra note 70, at 293.
137. Ben L. Kedia & Somnath Lahiri, International Outsourcing of Services: A Partnership
Model, 13 J. INT’L MGMT. 22, 30 (2007).
138. Id.
139. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 257 (1978).
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Resource dependence theory also can be integrated with agency theory
and transaction cost theory. One theme of both agency theory and
transaction cost theory is opportunism—the idea that contracting parties
have an incentive to act in their own interest, which may well conflict with
the interest of their contracting partner. 140 Resource dependence theory links
some of these interests. It suggests that organizations will “respond most
quickly and substantively to those stakeholders upon whom they depend for
resources.” 141 Thus, large corporate clients like Microsoft may find LPO
vendors to be especially responsive to meeting their needs. On the other
hand, smaller clients who supply only a fraction of the vendors’ resources
may find the vendors to be less responsive.
Resource dependence theory helps to explain why many large
corporations are beginning to reduce the total number of firms performing
legal work for them. As one lawyer noted, when work was spread among a
large number of law firms, the firms had little incentive to offer discounted
fees or to “give close management attention to the work.” 142 Because each
firm had little to gain from the relationship, general counsels also believe
that the “firms had little incentive to cooperate with one another on our
behalf by sharing information and collaborating.” 143 Law firms themselves
may simply drop smaller clients—in some cases, lawyers “serving smaller,
more local clients were expressly told to drop these matters and to refocus
their efforts on providing support for the firm’s large global clients.” 144
For large corporate clients, the solution to the resource dependence
problem may involve consolidating work so that a smaller number of
outside firms perform their work, thus allowing the company to retain

140. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs:
A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 654 (1993) (“Parties to
agency relationships often adopt private strategies to overcome opportunism and minimize
transaction costs—to address the barriers to fully contingent bargains between principals and
agents.”); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial
Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 228 (1991) (“The term
‘opportunism’ is not defined precisely in either the legal or economic literature. As commonly
used, however, the term carries negative connotations, describing instances in which someone
reneges on an agreement or understanding to take advantage of a new opportunity.”).
141. Mary E. Graham & Julie L. Hotchkiss, A Systemic Assessment of Employer Equal
Employment Opportunity Efforts As a Means of Reducing the Gender Earnings Gap, 12
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 184 (2002); see also PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 139;
Melissa W. Barringer & George T. Milkovich, A Theoretical Exploration of the Adoption and
Design of Flexible Benefit Plans: A Case of Human Resource Innovation, 23 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 305, 305–24 (1998).
142. Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2086.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2091.
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“trophy client” status. 145 Smaller clients are unlikely to have this option—
they likely do not generate enough work to obtain trophy client status.
These smaller companies may have better luck seeking out a more
specialized vendor. 146 Even if no particular client is supplying the majority
of the vendor’s resources, the vendor may otherwise focus on the client’s
business category, for example, working with particular types of small firms
or cases (e.g., small bankruptcy firms or no-fault insurance cases 147).
Because the clients are similar, the vendor can supply similar services to all
of them, thus gaining the responsiveness benefit suggested by resourcedependence theory. 148
Resources need not be monetary. There are at least four different species
of capital that play a role in the outsourcing equation—economic,
intellectual, social, and symbolic. 149 Economic capital is the funding that
clients pay for outsourcing services. 150 Intellectual capital consists of
specialized knowledge and competence in the field; 151 both clients and
vendors possess such intellectual capital, and, at least in the case of highlevel legal outsourcing, the client is paying the vendor specifically for
sharing the vendor’s legal knowledge and competence. Social capital
includes access to stakeholders and decisionmakers. 152 When a client hires
an onshore law firm as an intermediary to manage the outsourcing process,
the law firm has access to valuable social capital because it deals directly
with the client. 153 When the corporate client hires an offshore vendor
directly, the offshore worker may have greater access to this social
145. Id. at 2087 (noting that “companies hope to leverage their status as a ‘trophy client’ to
exact deeper discounts and package rates”).
146. Indeed, some LPOs advertise that they specialize in serving smaller businesses. See,
e.g., Why Mangalam, MANGALAM INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.mangalam
infotech.com/whymangalam.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“We have a conscious focus to
serve small & medium sized enterprises . . . . Small and medium size clients do not get the kind
of attention from large out sourcing companies for more than one reason. . . . At Mangalam,
since our focus is serving the small and medium business, we go the extra mile to understand
and align our service offerings with our clients.”).
147. See Roy A. Mura, New York No-Fault Insurance Law Blogs, COVERAGE COUNSEL
(Feb. 17, 2010, 6:10 PM), http://nycoveragecounsel.blogspot.com/2009/03/new-york-no-faultblogs.html (noting that some no-fault insurance work is currently being outsourced to India).
148. Greg C. Cheyne, Comment, Facially Discriminatory Admissions Policies in Homeless
Shelters and the Fair Housing Act, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 459, 470 (2009) (making the same
point in the context of homeless shelter providers seeking to offer services to “homogeneous
clients”).
149. Natalia Levina & Emmanuelle Vaast, Innovating or Doing as Told? Status Differences
and Overlapping Boundaries in Offshore Collaboration, 32 MIS Q. 307, 323 (2008).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See infra Part III.A.1 (describing the law firm quarterback outsourcing model).
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capital. 154 Finally, symbolic capital includes measures of status and the
“authority to judge outcomes.” 155 Symbolic capital most often resides with
the outsourcing client, though balancing the power inherent in symbolic
capital will likely improve the quality of the outsourcing relationship. 156
B.

Organizational Behavior Theory

The socioeconomic theories discussed above are helpful in
understanding some of the parties’ differing incentives, capabilities, and
resources in the outsourcing relationship. But these aspects, which depend
heavily on rational choice, are insufficient to explain why outsourcing
projects succeed or fail. 157 Organizational and psychological factors also
play a large role in explaining the outcome of outsourcing projects. This
section examines theories from organizational behavior and social
psychology to look more closely at the human side of the outsourcing
process.
Organizational behavior studies human behavior and psychology within
the situational and institutional setting. 158 It can help fill some of the gaps in
traditional economic theory, which has been criticized for its “narrow view
of rationality” and inattention to ethical norms. 159 In this section, I examine
three particular ways in which the human element interacts with
organizations in the outsourcing process. First, social exchange theory helps
explain how parties to a contract engage each other over time, attempting to
create balance and mutuality. 160 Second, research on the psychological
contract describes how employees’ unspoken assumptions and expectations
can influence the quality of the work they perform. 161 Third, the concepts of
exit, voice, and loyalty can help illuminate how employees will react when
problems arise. 162
154. See infra Part III.A.2–3 (describing the corporate extension and service provider
models).
155. Levina & Vaast, supra note 149, at 323.
156. See infra Part IV.D.
157. REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 20 (2d ed. 2010) (“Not only do the choices
of individuals and social decision-making groups tend to violate the principle of maximizing
expected utility; they are also often patently irrational.”).
158. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129,
154 (2003).
159. Orts, supra note 122, at 277 (citing Levinthal, supra note 122, at 154).
160. See infra Part II.B.1.
161. See infra Part II.B.2.
162. See infra Part II.B.3.
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Social Exchange Theory

Social Exchange Theory focuses on the relationship between actors—
either firms or individuals—over time. 163 It defines “social exchange” as
“the voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they
are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others.” 164 Social
exchange theory assumes that people will, over time, act in ways that
maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative ones. 165 It further
assumes that the relationship arises from “mutual dependence”—that is,
“both parties have some reason to engage in exchange to obtain resources of
value.”
Four concepts underlie social exchange theory. The first, reciprocity,
focuses on the mutuality of benefit. 166 The second, balance, examines how
dependent each actor is on the other—a condition that is likely to change
over time. 167 Cohesion, the third factor, measures the strength of the
relationship and its ability to survive conflict. 168 Finally, the fourth factor,
power-balancing, arises from the assumption that “actors are motivated to
maintain or increase their power in exchange relations to increase benefits
and to minimize losses.” 169
Social exchange theory is useful in analyzing outsourcing relationships
over time. Although the practice of legal offshoring is still relatively young,
the field is characterized by ongoing relationships. Approximately seventy
percent of offshoring contracts in general are renewed, 170 and clients’
overall satisfaction with legal outsourcing relationships suggests that most
outsourcing relationships will continue past the initial contract. The
complexity of the legal services performed grows as the relationship
lengthens. Companies typically start out with simpler contracts for simpler
services that grow over time as the client develops trust in the vendor. 171
Social exchange theory’s discussion of “mutual dependence” applies
163. Karen S. Cook, Coye Cheshire & Alexandra Gerbasi, Power, Dependence and Social
Exchange, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 194, 196 (Peter J. Burke ed.,
2006).
164. PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 91 (1964) (quoted in
Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 254).
165. Linda D. Molm & Karen S. Cook, Social Exchange and Exchange Networks, in
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 209, 210 (Karen Cook et al. eds., 1995).
166. Lyn H. Lofland, Social Interaction: Continuities and Complexities in the Study of
Non-Intimate Sociality, in SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 165, at 176, 197.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 196–97.
170. Christian, supra note 9.
171. Interview with Kevin Colangelo, supra note 100.
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forcefully in the outsourcing context, where scholars report that trust on
both sides is critical to the ongoing relationship:
Clients need to trust their providers with regard to desired quality
and timing of service delivery, maintenance of confidentiality and
security of inside information, and non-display of opportunistic
behavior that might lead to loss of control over the outsourced
activity or even double outsourcing that involves subcontracting
work elsewhere for additional profits. Likewise, providers need to
trust their clients in the matters of demand stability, timely
payment of contract amounts, release of promised incentives, and
adherence to ethical and legal standards particularly when disputes
arise. 172

When two contracting parties focus on long-term strategies, each has “an
incentive to invest in the long-term health of the other.” 173 But in order to
make the long-term relationship work, both parties must avoid short-term
opportunism in the interest of developing a longer-term beneficial
alliance. 174
2.

The Psychological Contract

While the theories described above focus on the relationship of the two
firms involved in the outsourcing process, other theories focus more
attention on the individual employees involved in the process. These
employees are critical to the success of any outsourcing venture. Thus, the
next two subsections focus on the relationship between the employees and
the firms that employ them.
Organizational behavior theory suggests that all employees—whether
full-time, part-time, or contract employees—form unwritten “psychological
contracts” with their employer. 175 When the employer does not share the
same understanding, conflict can arise. Thus, such a psychological contract
for temporary employees may include the possibility of being hired on fulltime once the employees have proved their skills. 176 Likewise, full-time
employees may have an expectation that their jobs will be secure as long as
172. Kedia & Lehiri, supra note 137, at 31–32 (citations omitted).
173. Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2115.
174. Id. at 2116 (citing BENJAMIN GOMES-CASSERES, THE ALLIANCE REVOLUTION: THE
NEW SHAPE OF BUSINESS RIVALRY 95 (1996)).
175. Judi McLean Parks et al., Fitting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mapping the Domain
of Contingent Work Arrangements onto the Psychological Contract, 19 J. ORG. BEHAV. 687,
723 (1998); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 980–81 (2007).
176. Parks et al., supra note 175, at 723.
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they perform competent work, and this conception may be threatened when
they see the organization hiring contingent workers. 177 When there are
multiple employers involved in a contract, “employees may face conflicting
psychological contracts with each employer,” 178 as the employers may have
different expectations of the employee and may have conflicting interests in
regard to the employee. 179
In outsourcing, the psychological contract comes into play among
employees of both onshore and offshore entities. Onshore, many young
attorneys are worried about the stability of their jobs. They have seen
numerous rounds of layoffs, and may feel that their jobs are threatened by
international outsourcing. 180 Attorneys working offshore are likely to
internalize the psychological contract differently. 181 Full-time offshore
employees, like their onshore counterparts, may expect stable work, reliable
hours, and opportunities to advance into a management role. 182 Contingent
contract workers hired overseas, by contrast, may or may not have the same
expectations.
The psychological contract depends upon cultural variations potentially
affected by outsourcing. An employee may, for example, expect to be
accorded respect according to age. At least one LPO provider specifically
notes that such an expectation will not necessarily bear out in practice: an
executive noted that “designations are not proportional to age but only to
merit and performance. A 40-year-old may have to report to a 27-year-old,
depending on their individual experiences and performance in the company.
. . . It’s more like the work culture in the West.” 183 While this arrangement
promotes flexibility, it may also cause employees to feel discomfort when
the unstated psychological contract is violated.

177. Id.
178. Id. at 719.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, Outsourcing: It’s Not Just About the Money, ABOVE THE LAW
(June 9, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/outsourcing-its-not-just-about-themoney/ (referring to “the coming junior associate apocalypse that is legal outsourcing”).
181. Rosemary Ambale, Is “Contract Attorneys” a Really Good Idea?, WITCHCRAFT (Oct.
19, 2008, 4:00 PM), http://rosemary-witchcraft.blogspot.com/2008/10/is-contract-attorneysreally-good-idea.html (noting that offshore contract employees may feel more tempted to
engage in disloyal conduct than do full-time employees).
182. Id.
183. Behind the Indian Hiring Boom for Legal Services Outsourcing: The Economic Times
Interviews Sanjay Kamlani of Pangea3, LAW WITHOUT BORDERS: ADVENTURES IN LEGAL
OUTSOURCING TO INDIA AND BEYOND (May 31, 2010), http://lawwithoutborders.typepad.com/
legaloutsourcing/2010/05/behind-the-indian-hiring-boom-for-legal-services-outsourcing-theeconomic-times-interviews-sanjay-ka.html.
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Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

Albert Hirschman famously observed that there are two main ways
actors can deal with dissatisfaction in an ongoing relationship: exit (leaving
employment) and voice (articulating discontent in order to promote
change). 184 He notes that voice can act as an alternative to exit or a
complement to it; exit may be a last resort after voicing discontent failed to
achieve the desired changes. 185 Loyalty will affect how those choices play
out; according to Hirschman, “as a rule . . . loyalty holds exit at bay and
activates voice.” 186
Research on outsourcing arrangements suggests that the arrangements
affect employees’ decision to engage in both “exit” and “voice.” 187 For
example, researchers found that when workforces were blended, so that
standard full-time employees worked side-by-side with contingent
employees, the blending “worsened relations between managers and
employees, decreased standard employees’ loyalty, and increased their
interest both in leaving their organizations and in exercising voice through
unionization.” 188 While these results would not necessarily carry over into
the offshoring context where there is greater distance between the different
types of employees, it is possible that offshoring would lead to a similar
result. As other scholars have pointed out, outsourcing can be a “subtle
reminder to employees [of the client firm] of their potentially uncertain job
status.” 189 Employee satisfaction—and options for exercising
dissatisfaction—should be considered both at the client and vendor level
when engaging in outsourcing agreements.
The exit/voice/loyalty relationship can also interact with the
psychological contract. When employees’ unstated expectations are not
met, employees are less likely to feel loyal to the employer. Again, such
expectations can vary by culture. Because attorneys in the United States are
acculturated to associate the practice of law with prestige and power, an
employment relationship that breaches this expectation may engender
negative feelings. One attorney who worked as a temporary employee doing

184. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21–30 (1970).
185. Id. at 37.
186. Id. at 78.
187. Alison Davis-Blake, Joseph P. Broschak & Elizabeth George, Happy Together? How
Using Nonstandard Workers Affects Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Among Standard Employees, 46
ACAD. MGMT. J. 475, 482 (2003).
188. Id. at 475.
189. Regan & Heenan, supra note 14, at 2184.
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document review at a major U.S. law firm reported feeling subjugated and
belittled by the employment conditions at the firm:
The environment here is god-awful—literally. We have 10
people in a room of less than 200 square feet of space. It’s in the
middle of the floor where “real people” actually walk by and stare.
It’s almost as though we’re looked at as animals. I could go on
and on, but I need to hit my number of docs per hour just so I can
keep my “legal” job. 190

Similar work conditions at an Indian LPO may be interpreted very
differently. As noted above, the practice of law does not carry the same
expectation of prestige and power that it does in the U.S. 191 In addition,
Indian attorneys working at LPOs may value different aspects of the
document review job. To LPO employees, the positions offer relatively
good salaries by Indian standards, maintain “a corporate atmosphere that
[i]s ‘safe’ for women,” and offer a coveted opportunity to perform “global”
work while developing transferable skill sets. 192 As a result, document
review work may fulfill the psychological contract for Indian employees
while not fulfilling it for American employees—thus creating higher
satisfaction and loyalty in India.
Finally, exit, voice, and loyalty can come into play at the client/vendor
level as well. Just as an employee can choose to leave employment, so too
can a client choose whether to renew a contract with the legal services
vendor. When problems arise, will the client voice dissatisfaction? And will
the vendor respond to the client’s concerns in a way that encourages the
contractual relationship to continue? Loyalty, built over time and through
close communication, may encourage the client to voice concerns without
exiting the contractual relationship.

190. David Lat, Skaddenfreude: A Look Inside the Life of a Kirkland & Ellis Contract
Attorney, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 17, 2010, 10:04 AM) http://abovethelaw.com/
2010/08/skaddenfreude-a-look-inside-the-life-of-a-kirkland-ellis-contract-attorney/#more-31259
(reproducing an email from a U.S. attorney working as a contract employee).
191. See PANDEY, supra note 23, at 60.
192. David B. Wilkins, Swethaa Ballakrishnen & Shaun J. Mathew, Putting India Back Into
the Indian LPO Debate, Presentation at the International Legal Ethics Conference IV, Stanford
Law School (July 16, 2010) (language taken from powerpoint presentation used during speech),
available
at
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/ilec4/files/2010/07/Panel-5F-Wilkins-andBallakrishnen-ppt-.pdf.
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SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON LEGAL OFFSHORING

The theoretical constructs described in the prior section can help
understand many of the dynamics at play in the offshore outsourcing
relationship, but situational influences are equally important, and often
overlooked. 193 Scholars have adopted an approach called “situationism” to
examine the power of the external environment and circumstances to
influence behavior. Situationism “challenges the notion that ethical
behavior is primarily the work of good character . . . . [and] instead suggests
that behavior is highly context-dependent and often differs based on what
seem to be trivial differences between one situation and another.” 194
Likewise, the impact of outsourcing on lawyers’ ethical duties of
competence, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest will be significantly
influenced by the situational context in which legal services are rendered.
While the prior section focused on general risks of contracting within the
legal services industry, this section focuses on risks that arise from the
particular context of offshore outsourcing. It first examines the benefits and
costs of three different models of allocating responsibility. Second, it
examines risks that arise from varying employment contexts and conditions.
Finally, it analyzes problems that can arise from cross-cultural status and
hierarchy differences with the outsourcing process.
A.

Allocation of Responsibility

When legal work is outsourced, it is also disaggregated by necessity.
Instead of having a single lawyer—or even a single law firm—responsible
for the legal work in its entirety, outsourcing means that part of the legal
work will be separated and performed elsewhere. Thus, by definition, there
will be some diffusion of responsibility. How this responsibility is allocated
will affect the organizational dynamics involved in the provision of legal
services, thereby affecting the overall quality of those services. This section
examines the most common models for allocation of responsibility and
analyzes costs and benefits of each model.

193. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 15; see also Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The
Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal
Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 328–38 (2008).
194. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1963 (2006).
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The Law-Firm Quarterback Model

In the “quarterback” model, the corporate client relies heavily on an
outside law firm to direct the outsourcing process. This model, especially
popular in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, puts the law firm in a
“quarterback” or “foreman” role. 195 The law firm functions as an
intermediary between clients and LPO firms, directing the legal
representation and ensuring that each piece of the representation is handled
by the provider best suited to complete the work. Some law firms may set
up a captive center offshore, while others work with independent vendors. 196
Having the law firm take this central role helps to improve the coordination
of legal services by ensuring that legal strategy is directed by a central
source.
Having a law firm quarterbacking the outsourcing arrangement can
mediate some of the agency costs. The client, for example, wants to reduce
expenses, while the LPO provider wants to maximize revenue. As between
the LPO vendor and the client, the law firm can be in a more neutral
position, able to direct assignments, monitor productivity, and evaluate
work product. 197 The model is also more expensive, however, because the
client must pay the onshore firm for the time spent coordinating and
supervising these services.
2.

The Corporate Extension Model

In the “extension” model, often also called a “captive center” model,
corporate law departments work directly with offshore legal professionals,
viewing them as an extension of the in-house legal department. 198 Under
this model, offshore workers are generally employed directly by a corporate
subsidiary, as in the GE case. 199 Furthermore, there is still one overarching
organization, and it is not unreasonable to consider the offshore site an
extension of the corporate legal department.

195. Jordan Furlong, The Evolution of Outsourcing, LAW21 (June 8, 2010),
http://www.law21.ca/2010/06/08/the-evolution-of-outsourcing/.
196. See Evalueserve, supra note 36 (noting that Clifford Chance has a captive center in
India that provides IT, finance, and accounting support, and Baker & McKenzie has a captive in
the Philippines that provides desktop publishing support).
197. While the law firm may be in a good position to mediate between client and vendor
interests, it also has its own interests that differ from each, and those interests may also add to
the overall agency costs. See supra Part II.A.1.
198. Furlong, supra note 195.
199. See Evalueserve, supra note 36 (noting that in addition to GE, Motorola, DuPont, and
Phillips also have captive centers offshore).
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The corporate extension model cuts some of the costs present in the law
firm quarterback model, as the client does not have to pay for an onshore
law firm to coordinate services. The corporate extension model may also
enhance communication between the corporate client and offshore workers,
as there are fewer layers between the client and the legal service
professionals, and there is more likely to be a continuously ongoing
relationship between the corporation and its offshore partner. In this sense,
the client is able to realize the advantages of resource-dependence—because
the subsidiary is fully dependent on a single corporate client, it will be
maximally responsive to client’s needs. 200 On the other hand, the extension
model may be available only to the largest corporate clients, as it requires
large economies of scale for a company to independently recruit, train, and
employ offshore employees.
3.

The Service-Provider Model

Under the “service-provider” model, corporations will contract with a
third-party LPO vendor. In this model, the corporate client pays somewhat
more to hire an intermediary firm to hire and train offshore employees. This
model has the benefit of familiarity; the corporation has most likely used a
service-provider model in other contexts, such as contracting for software
development, printing services, and other business operations. 201
The service-provider model may offer greater flexibility to corporate
clients. The corporation will not need to sustain its own offshore workforce,
but can instead hire only the hours of labor needed from the LPO vendor.
This flexibility is offset by substantial supervision responsibilities, however.
Because the legal service providers are neither directly employed by the
corporate client nor supervised by outside counsel, the general counsel’s
office will have to undertake the burden of supervising the legal services. 202
B.

Working Conditions of LPO Professionals

When a client hires an LPO firm to provide legal services, it is likely to
focus primary attention on the firm itself—its consideration of LPO
200. See supra Part II.A.3.
201. Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 413–14 (“[C]orporate general counsel (GCs) may be
more likely to try offshore outsourcing than law firms because they are influenced by the
successful experiences of other corporate departments that have outsourced work overseas.”).
202. See id. at 445 (noting that GCs who outsource directly “may be comfortable judging
competence and capability according to their own criteria and on the basis of their knowledge of
the firms and lawyers”).
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employees may be limited to verifying their credentials and experience. 203
Nevertheless, the employment conditions of LPO employees can
significantly affect the legal services offered. Employee working conditions
that contravene social norms may lead to emotional distress and breakdown
of working relations. 204 This breakdown, in turn, can shift the
exit/voice/loyalty calculation, ultimately affecting compliance with ethical
duties.
Even non-malicious employment decisions such as hiring temporary
rather than permanent employees can lead to consequences that ultimately
harm client interests. As one LPO professional noted, utilizing contract
employees can raise the risks of disclosure of confidences and can open the
door to conflicts of interest. 205 Because the contract employees suffer
periods of unemployment between jobs, and because they also migrate
between LPO providers who might be hired by opposing parties, the
employees may have incentives to share confidential information:
In such a situation, a contract employee learning of a defense
tactic employed by the defendant in a particular litigation, might
well be tempted to disclose the same to the opposite party in the
same litigation or in a subsequent suit, if he happens to be working
subsequently in an LPO that is handling litigation for that opposite
party. 206

If employees had an expectation of continued employment that was not
borne out in practice, they may feel betrayed when additional work is not
forthcoming and thus believe they are justified in behaving
opportunistically. In this regard, it may matter whether the contingent
employee was hired with a particular end date to the contract; without such
an anticipated end date, the employee may have a greater psychological
expectation that work will continue. 207 The employer need not have created
such an expectation of future work; it may have been part of the employee’s
unarticulated psychological contract. 208
203. See ABA Opinion 08-451, supra note 33, at 3 (recommending that attorneys managing
an outsourcing process pay particular attention to the employment conditions of offshore
workers); see also Matthew Sullivan, Working with LPO Vendors: Relationship or
Transaction?, GLOBAL LEGAL (Oct. 28, 2009, 11:28 AM), http://globallegal.wordpress.com/
2009/10/28/working-with-lpo-vendors-relationship-or-transaction/ (noting that UK attorneys
appear “more prepared to accept and manage LPO teams than their U.S. counterparts”).
204. See, e.g., text accompanying note 183 (discussing different norms of authority by age,
experience, and performance).
205. Ambale, supra note 181.
206. Id.
207. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 14, at 2181–83.
208. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Similar breaches of confidential information have been threatened by
contract workers involved in other types of outsourcing. For example, one
contract worker in Pakistan threatened to post patient health records online
if a San Francisco hospital failed to pay her for medical transcription
services. 209 Interestingly, the hospital had not offshored the transcription
work—but it did outsource it to a Florida vendor. 210 The Florida vendor
then allegedly subcontracted the work to a man in Texas, who then hired the
contractor in Pakistan, and failed to pay for the work performed. 211 In this
case, the employee’s opportunistic—and damaging—behavior was not
caused by the breach of an underlying psychological contract, but rather by
the breach of an explicit contract, when the worker was not paid as
promised.
Unauthorized disclosure in legal offshoring is rare, and LPO vendors’
strict controls on the information provided to employees reduce some of the
risk of such disclosure. It is typical for the LPO firms to institute
mechanical controls on employee access to confidential information; at
Evalueserve, one of the larger firms, “employee computers don’t have
functional USB ports. All paper in the office is color coded, and employees
aren’t allowed to take even bits of paper out of the office.” 212
These mechanical controls are a type of agency cost; they allow parties
to minimize the risk of ethical breaches by adding monitoring costs that
control employee access to information. 213 The control may also contribute
to the client/vendor relationship over time. As long as the controls are
consistently implemented and effective, they may aid the process of
building mutual trust between client and vendor. 214
209. David Lazarus, Looking Offshore: Outsourced UCSF Notes Highlight Privacy Risk:
How One Offshore Worker Sent Tremor Through Medical System, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2004,
at A1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-03-28/news/17417090_1_ucsf-medicalcenter-patient-records-privacy/7.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Ben Frumin, $250 Billion Legal Outsourcing Business from the West Eyed by India,
BIZ INDIA (Apr. 2008), http://www.bizindia.net/news/News.asp?NewsID=142&Page=4; see
also ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 33, at 13 (“Exploring the range of additional guidance
currently available to lawyers, the Commission reviewed materials from domestic and
international outsourcing providers themselves, finding substantial evidence that the providers
are also focused on the ethical considerations and obligations identified in the organized bars’
ethics opinions, and that they are motivated to do so. Protocols developed by the providers of
outsourced legal and non-legal services evidence their use of ever more sophisticated
technology to ensure quality control of the outsourced work, to provide adequate security over
personnel and information, and to increase the opportunities for and convenience of oversight
by the lawyers and law firms that are outsourcing the work.”).
213. See supra Part II.A.1.
214. See supra Part II.B.1.
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What these controls cannot accomplish, however, is to secure the
employee’s loyalty. With such strict controls in place, the employees may
feel that they are not trusted, and may have no personal stake in
contributing to the relationship. In such a case, the employer’s attention to
the psychological contract takes on an even more important role. If the
employee expects stable employment, he or she may feel betrayed if the
LPO employer terminates employees when work is slow—and that sense of
betrayal may diminish loyalty, increasing the risk that the employee will
take action adverse to the employer’s interest. For this reason, at least one
LPO professional recommends that firms hire full-time employees “whose
loyalties are secured.” 215
C.

Status Barriers

As noted above, some LPOs are hiring U.S.-licensed attorneys to provide
quality review before outsourced work is delivered to the client. 216 While
such an organizational structure may increase client comfort, 217 it may also
exacerbate perceived disparities in status; LPO employees may feel
uncomfortable if they perceive “US and UK attorneys metamorphosing into
top management honchos overnight:” 218
US and UK attorneys who would never otherwise have
dreamed of visiting the Orient are making a beeline for India and
China and happily playing leading roles in LPOs. At home, they
would probably still be struggling juniors, serving summonses and
recording EBTs. Here, they manage large teams of Indian lawyers
and head ambitious projects. Their salaries may not be as high as
what they might have earned in the US even at the lowest rung of
their careers, but the lower cost of living both in India and China
more than makes up for that. Furthermore, LPOs in India are
based in metros where the standard of living can be even more
lavish than abroad, what with malls, multiplexes, and in-house
help for every chore. 219

215. Ambale, supra note 181.
216. Rosemary Ambale, Sala Main to Sahab Ban Gayaa, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS SIDE
OF THE POND (Aug. 25, 2009, 6:59 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/
2009/08/sala-main-to-sahab-ban-gayaa.html (“With the ABA mandating strict legal supervision
on all legal work that is outsourced, many LPOs set up in India have begun hiring US attorneys
not only to satisfy compliance with due diligence procedures but also to increase the comfort
levels of their clients.”).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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In general, scholars report that the legal profession in India does not
possess the same prestige that it does in the United States. 220 Specifically,
they have noted a “prevailing disparity in this field” as “lawyers in the top
bracket are becoming increasingly wealthy even by international standards”
while the “vast majority are struggling to make both ends meet despite
being otherwise competent.” 221
Indian attorneys who work for LPOs, however, tend to be at the higher
end of the spectrum. Many LPOs report that they hire only from the top
twenty law schools in India—given that there are more than 500 law
schools in the country, this is quite a small fraction. 222 Thus, working
closely with U.S.-licensed attorneys may cause discomfort, especially when
“[t]he salaries paid to these attorneys are invariably twice and thrice what an
Indian lawyer is paid for the same job.” 223
These pay disparities lead to status disparities. Outsourcing research
from other industries has found that even when offshore salaries were high
for their locality, those salaries were still “miniscule compared to the
salaries of onshore people.” 224 The onshore/offshore disparities led to a
“perception of onshore participants” that “low pay was associated with low
status,” leading onshore participants to view their offshore partners “as
cheap, low quality worker-bees who could be ordered around.” 225
Such status barriers can be even greater when combined with preexisting prejudice on the part of onshore clients:
I can vouch that . . . Indian lawyers are performing as well and in
some cases better than their US counterparts. What is really
dampening is that where both US and Indian lawyers happen to be
working on the same matter, the US lawyer automatically assumes
that any error in the case is the work of the India team. Maybe he
has reason. But what is worse is that the Indian team is quite
willing to assume that somehow it must be their fault. This, I
220. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 60; see also Krishnan, supra note 53, at 62 (noting that
Indian legal culture has an overall focus on courtroom litigation, but “[t]he overall reputation of
these courtroom advocates in India is mixed. A common belief is that lawyers who practice at
the district court level are poorly reputed. . . . But recent work has shown variation in this
group’s perception by clients and the community.”).
221. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 60.
222. Interview with Kevin Colangelo, supra note 100; see also James Dean, How Legal
Process Outsourcing Is Changing the Legal Landscape, L. SOC’Y GAZETTE (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/in-business/a-first-hand-look-a-legal-process-outsourcer-providerindia (noting that “CPA only recruits lawyers with degrees from ‘tier-one or tier-two’ law
schools, of which there are 20 to 25”).
223. Ambale, supra note 216.
224. Levina & Vaast, supra note 149, at 316.
225. Id.
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think, is the effect of years of British rule which has left us with a
definite inferiority complex. 226

Research on the psychological contract and on exit, voice, and loyalty
suggests that these status barriers will be most keenly felt when U.S. and
Indian attorneys work side-by-side. Just as the presence of contingent
employees reminded the permanent employees that their employment
arrangement was fragile, 227 so too can the presence of U.S. attorneys change
the frames of reference for Indian attorneys. An LPO salary that appears
excellent in light of the salaries earned by law school classmates 228 may not
seem quite as good when compared to the much higher salaries of U.S.
attorneys doing the same or similar work.
Some elements of the status disparity may be a necessary cost of doing
business; after all, supervision of the work by U.S. attorneys is required by
the ethics opinions approving outsourcing arrangements. 229 Nevertheless,
both vendor and client should be aware of the possibility of employee
discomfort, and should try to minimize status barriers when possible. At a
minimum, both the client and the vendor should be aware of the dangers of
implicit bias, 230 and should be wary of too quickly assigning blame to the
non-U.S. employees. Other strategies for minimizing the negative effect of
status barriers on collaboration are discussed more fully in Part IV.B.
IV.

SHIFTING FRAMES OF REFERENCE: FROM DISAGGREGATION TO
COLLABORATION

As discussed in the prior sections, understanding the socioeconomic and
organizational theories related to outsourcing can help predict where risks
will arise from differing incentives in the contracting process.231
Understanding the situational context of legal outsourcing can help predict
risks that arise from gaps in the allocation of responsibility or from cultural

226. Ambale, supra note 55.
227. Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 475; Parks et al., supra note 175, at 723.
228. In a large law firm in India, junior attorneys may earn roughly the equivalent of $220
to $400 a month. If apprenticed to an individual lawyer (a solo practitioner) they would likely
earn only $100 to $220 a month. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 75.
229. See ABA Opinion 08-451, supra note 33.
230. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 143 (2004) (noting that “individuals
who belong to socially advantaged groups typically exhibit more implicit preference for their
ingroups and bias against outgroups than do members of socially disadvantaged groups”).
231. See supra Part II.
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misunderstandings. 232 Once potential risks have been identified, the parties
to the outsourcing process can take steps to minimize those risks.
Successful outsourcing has been said to require “good communications
skills, along with the ability to motivate workers from different
organizations, negotiate and administer service contracts, assemble effective
teams, and plan for and respond to contingencies.” 233 Each of these skills is
undoubtedly important: a client that focuses only on the financial cost of
outsourcing will miss important factors that influence the ultimate success
or failure of the legal venture. To integrate consideration of those
organizational and personal factors, this section recommends that clients
considering offshoring legal services move from a disaggregation model to
a collaboration model. It argues that a collaborative model can better align
incentives, improve working conditions, smooth cultural differences, and
thereby improve the quality and effectiveness of outsourced legal services.
A.

The Disaggregation Model

Legal outsourcing began with disaggregation: discrete tasks were carved
out of the overall legal representation and sent off-site, first to contract
attorneys in the United States, and more recently to other countries. 234
Recently, a number of articles have begun to examine the disaggregation
phenomenon generally, offering a definition of the practice and general
insight into the disaggregation process. 235 Disaggregation involves the
(usually sophisticated) client “break[ing] legal representations into pieces
and assign[ing] responsibility for different tasks to an appropriate service
provider.” 236 Clients view disaggregation as a way to cut costs, but also as a
way to increase specialization, sending discrete tasks to the provider best
able to manage that particular piece of the process. For example, the client
might contract with a specialized e-discovery firm to process electronicallystored information for discovery. 237 Disaggregation also involves an
element of what Richard Susskind has termed “commoditization of legal
232. See supra Part III.
233. Regan & Heenan, supra note 14, at 2189.
234. See id. at 2188–89 (describing the disaggregation of legal tasks and use of contract
lawyers).
235. See, e.g., id.; Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Co-Counsel:
Joint Venturers or Scorpions in a Bottle?, 98 KY. L.J. 461 (2010); Molly E. Crane, Note, Let’s
Be Reasonable About It: Defining the Reasonable Inquiry in an Age of Disaggregation, 23 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 555 (2010); John Steele, Disaggregation: An Emerging Issue, BEAZLEY BRIEF
(2009), available at http://www.legalethicsforum.com/files/beazleybrief_0109-3.pdf.
236. Steele, supra note 235, at 1.
237. Id. at 1–2.
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services”—the idea that “a legal service or offering is very readily available
in the market, often from a variety of sources, and certainly at a highly
competitive price. . . . a raw material that can be sourced from one of
various suppliers.” 238
Outsourcing itself cannot exist without some disaggregation and
commodification of legal services, as multiple parties are necessarily
involved in the provision of those services. But the disaggregation model is
more psychological than structural. It assumes an outlook in which each
legal provider will function independently and autonomously. In the words
of a legal services director at an Indian LPO, firms would be “perceived as
product suppliers/vendors,” instead of being perceived as “service
providers.” 239 The disaggregation model focuses on the ultimate product,
such as a completed document review, a contract database, or a legal brief,
rather than the process that created that product.
Disaggregation as an organizational model of legal service is larger than
disaggregation as a component of outsourcing. The disaggregation model
comes into play when responsibility is diffused between various legal
service providers, with each operating autonomously. 240 Even without any
offshore participation, large-scale litigation is likely to be disaggregated
into various components. 241 Responsibility is often divided between
“national, regional, and local representation, in addition to in-house counsel
participation.” 242
Because of its focus on autonomy, the disaggregation model leaves open
gaps in the chain of responsibility. 243 When mistakes occur—such as when a
party fails to disclose relevant material in discovery—it can be difficult to
ascertain who is responsible for the lapse. 244 The attorney responsible for
signing the discovery disclosure may be subject to sanctions, but that
attorney might be local counsel hired for court appearances, and might not
238. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 27, 29–30 (2008).
239. Sunita Shah, The Law Firm of the 21st Century, SUNITASHAH’S BLOG (July 8, 2010),
http://sunitashah.wordpress.com/2010/07/08/the-law-firm-of-the-21st-century/.
240. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 14, at 2148 (“Law firms, however, have been
decomposing their work within the firm for quite some time. They delegate responsibility for
discrete aspects of a case or a transaction to a variety of people, both lawyers and nonlawyers, in
what we may think of as a supply chain.”).
241. See Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2094 (“[O]utside firms are increasingly being invited
to become part of the multidisciplinary project team that carries out the company’s core
functions. . . . [I]n the modern corporation, ‘relations between inside and outside counsel . . .
may be summarized in one word: “partnering.”’”).
242. Crane, supra note 235, at 559.
243. See, e.g., id. at 560.
244. Id.
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have been involved in the decisionmaking that led to the failure to disclose
requested information. 245
The disaggregation model can also lead to opportunistic behavior. With
multiple parties involved, there may be incentives to “skirt the rules”
knowing that someone else is more likely to be held responsible. 246 Both
innocent mistakes and unchecked opportunistic behavior are part of the
residual loss predicted by transaction cost theory—they are costs that are
not allocated by the parties’ contract.
The problems of disaggregation are magnified when legal work is sent
offshore. Overseas service providers may not obtain feedback on the quality
or success of their work; employees may not have stable employment or
feel loyalty to either client or employer; status barriers may further inhibit
loyalty. 247 Each of these difficulties increases the transaction costs of the
outsourcing arrangement. 248 Increased monitoring, bonding, and policing
expenditures may offset some of those costs, but cannot, by themselves,
increase employee loyalty or provide the balanced social exchanges needed
to build a strong client/vendor relationship.
B.

The Collaboration Model

Moving toward a model of collaboration allows parties to obtain some of
the advantages of disaggregation while reducing the risks that arise from
gaps in the chain of responsibility. Within the practice of law, three primary
types of collaboration have been identified: lawyer to lawyer; lawyer to
client; client to client. 249 The outsourcing process largely focuses on the first
two models, though there is some room for all three.
In lawyer-to-lawyer collaboration, the corporate client’s outside law firm
may collaborate with offshore attorneys at an LPO vendor. Both onshore
counsel and offshore LPO firm act as agents in carrying out the client’s
legal instruction, and both collaborate together to ensure that the client’s
needs are met. In lawyer-to-client collaboration, the client (usually, in the
outsourcing realm, the corporate general counsel) will collaborate with
outside legal services providers, whether onshore, offshore, or both. And
finally, in client-to-client collaboration, clients may discuss their legal needs

245. Id. at 561–65.
246. Id. at 566.
247. See supra Part II.B.3.
248. See supra Part II.A.2.
249. Jordan Furlong, Metamorphosis: Five Forces Transforming the Legal Services
Marketplace, 36 LAW PRAC. 44, 47 (2010).
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with each other. 250 While direct economic competitors may not want to
share competitive advantages, general counsel in non-competing firms may
be willing to share some information about their experience with offshoring,
possibly by recommending particular providers or by sharing cautionary
tales. Finally, vendors of legal outsourcing services also share general
information, news, and strategies for best practices through networking
forums. 251
Under a collaborative model of outsourcing, work would still be
disaggregated in the sense that it is shared among various legal services
providers, both on- and off-shore. But unlike the disaggregation model’s
focus on autonomy and independent work, the collaborative model would
focus on cooperation, communication, and negotiation of status and
resources. 252 While these activities may appear relatively uncontroversial,
they are often overlooked by the disaggregation model—and this exclusion
leads less to effective legal representation.
1.

Cooperation

A focus on cooperation would assist the client, the outsourcing vendor,
and (if involved in the transaction) outside counsel in developing a stronger
relationship over time. Social exchange theory suggests that maintaining a
balanced, mutual relationship will assist the parties in maximizing positive

250. Client-to-client collaboration may involve clients in unrelated litigation
communicating with each other—essentially crowdsourcing legal advice in a particular area.
See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178–79 (coining term
“crowdsourcing” to describe “everyday people” collaborating to solve problems that in the past
might have required the assistance of paid professionals); see also Can I Please Just Ignore
These Tickets?, ASK METAFILTER (Jan. 27, 2010, 1:27 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/
142563/Can-I-please-just-ignore-these-tickets (individual seeking others’ advice about the legal
consequences of ignoring tickets for fare evasion on public transit). Conversely, it may involve
opposing clients working together with counsel in a non-adversarial manner, seeking to achieve
a mutually satisfactory result without resort to formal adjudication. See, e.g., Christopher M.
Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 505, 505–06 (2003).
251. For example, there are several legal outsourcing forums on LinkedIn.com, with active
discussions and forum posts. Interestingly, this collaboration does not seem to fit neatly within
either the lawyer-to-lawyer or client-to-client models. On the one hand, the participants are
indeed lawyers, but on the other hand, they are not working together on a case—and indeed,
they may be economic competitors.
252. Two of these principles—cooperation and communication—are also foundations of
traditional collaborative lawyering (i.e., non-adversarial client-to-client legal problem solving)
outside the outsourcing context. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 250, at 522.
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outcomes. 253 The more confidence the parties have in the relationship, the
more they are willing to continue it. 254
Cooperation begins with the choice of outsourcing partner. As noted,
resource dependence theory suggests that vendors will be more responsive
to clients who provide significant resources. 255 A large corporation with a
correspondingly large outsourcing budget may find many vendors that meet
its needs. Smaller companies, on the other hand, may do better with more
specialized outsourcing vendors.
Cost alone should not drive the choice of vendor. A client focused on
disaggregation may be more likely to choose a vendor based only on cost
and formal qualifications—after all, if the vendor is expected to work
autonomously, competence and cost may be the most important factors. 256
For a one-time contract, price and basic competence may be of overriding
importance. However, when contracting opportunities extend over time
between repeat players, social exchange theory suggests that the parties’
mutual dependence precludes such a narrow focus.
David Wilkins reports that Chrysler experienced a similar phenomenon
in purchasing automotive components. 257 When Chrysler purchased from
the lowest bidder “with little attention to prior history or performance,” it
maintained supplier relationships “characterized by mutual distrust and
suspicion.” 258 When Chrysler shifted to a model that allowed long-term
contracts based on performance and adopted pricing models based in part
on sustainable profits for suppliers, the company was able to reduce overall
costs and improve supplier performance. 259 The lesson for outsourcing
participants is that long-term cooperation may matter even more than shortterm costs. In choosing legal service providers, the client should look
beyond bid price to other factors that go into that relationship, ideally
choosing a vendor that can act as a partner—not just a product supplier.
Once the contract has been signed, cooperation should continue. At a
basic level, power dynamics favor the client. After all, the client controls
253. See supra Part II.B.1.
254. Ji-Ye Mao et al., Vendors’ Perspectives on Trust and Control in Offshore Information
Systems Outsourcing, 45 INFO. & MGMT. 482, 483 (2008).
255. See supra Part II.A.3.
256. The ABA’s formal outsourcing opinion also recommends that lawyers hiring
outsourcing firms pay attention to the employees of service providers, suggesting that the
outsourcing client “consider interviewing the principal lawyers” and “inquire into [the] hiring
practices” of LPO firms. See ABA Opinion 08-451, supra note 33.
257. Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2098 (quoting Jeffrey H. Dyer, How Chrysler Created an
American Keiretsu, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1996, at 42, 43).
258. Id.
259. Id.
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the outsourcing budget and chooses a vendor to hire. As social-exchange
theory suggests, however, one-sided power dynamics are not stable. If the
relationship continues over a longer term, the parties will take actions to
balance power within the contracting relationship. 260
Clients can assist that power-smoothing by giving “voice” to their
offshore counterparts and by treating them as partners in collaboration. A
recent study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers looked at shared elements of
successful outsourcing arrangements and found certain characteristics to be
particularly important. 261 Unsurprisingly, parties to successful outsourcing
were likely to report that their dealings with each other were “honest and
transparent.” 262 In addition, particular measures of collaboration also ranked
highly. 263 More than half the respondents reported that “[m]atters of mutual
interest [were] decided jointly,” and forty percent reported that their “[j]oint
governance structures [were] working effectively.” 264 Smaller, but still
significant, numbers of respondents also reported that “[r]isks and rewards
[were] shared” (31%) and “[s]uppliers [were] proactively innovative”
(27%). 265 Again, learning from the Chrysler experience, regularly meeting
with suppliers and establishing mechanisms by which the suppliers could
provide advice “produce[d] impressive dividends.” 266 These techniques can
be applied in the legal services context as well; contract negotiations should
be transparent, with both parties participating in joint decisionmaking, and
both parties bearing some of the risk and reaping potential reward.
Clients should also encourage proactive innovation from legal service
suppliers. In spite of their experience and knowledge, outsourcing vendors
across industries are rarely asked for feedback about improving the
outsourcing process. 267 One study found a “subtle but universal status
difference” between offshore and onshore participants in the outsourcing
process, in which “offshore participants were never asked to judge the
quality of the collaboration or the quality of the systems that were
developed” and “were never asked to report on the vendor’s view of the
how the project was going.” 268 On one occasion when feedback was offered,
“useful design suggestions were ignored as offshore developers were

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part II.B.1.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 111, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2099.
Levina & Vaast, supra note 149, at 317.
Id.
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thought to be uninformed about the business.” 269 This failure to seek input
from offshore participants may arise from ethnocentrism and implicit
cultural biases. 270 Because these failures operate unconsciously, 271
outsourcing clients should institutionalize processes for seeking feedback
from offshore partners. 272
2.

Communication

Communication between all the parties involved in the outsourcing
relationship is one of the most important aspects of a successful outsourcing
arrangement. It is likely to enhance the long-term relationship of client and
vendor by increasing cohesion and ensuring reciprocity. 273 It is thereby
likely to promote employee loyalty and improve the overall quality of legal
services rendered. Empirical work has confirmed the importance of
communication in outsourcing within the information technology sector.
One recent study found that an outsourcing client “can increase vendor’s
trust and thus improve customer relationship and project quality by ensuring
effective communication and increasing the range and depth of information
transfer.” 274
In spite of these advantages, some LPO professionals report that clients
do not always expect to engage in two-way communication. 275 In particular,
clients may not expect to engage in further communication after their
offshore partners complete assignments. 276 When clients do update LPO
providers on the results of their work, however, the offshore attorneys
report that it is extremely helpful. 277 One attorney reported that her team had
worked for a client performing patent invalidity searches, and noted that the
269. Id. at 315.
270. See infra Part III.C.
271. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural
Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 401 (2009) (“[S]tudies
show that even when individuals attempt to look beyond their own partisan biases, they are
unable to; those biases are buried so deeply in the unconscious that they cannot be called up at
will. Attempts to overcome unconscious partisan biases may even backfire, as asking people to
focus on potential partisan biases can reinforce prior positions.”).
272. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 14, at 2153 (noting that information found even in
basic processes such as document review can change the objectives of the legal representation,
and articulating the importance of communication and feedback processes within the
disaggregated legal services).
273. See supra Part II.B.1.
274. Mao et al., supra note 254, at 489.
275. David Hechler, Passage to India: Some Companies See Big Savings in “Offshoring”
Legal Work. But How’s the Quality?, CORP. COUNS. (Jan 1, 2009).
276. Id.
277. Id.
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attorneys “were often able to find documents that seemed to prove elements
of a patent invalid.” 278 Because the clients never updated LPO providers on
the status of the matter after those searches, “they never knew if their work
stood up in court.” 279 The attorney’s current employer, by contrast, offers
such updates within the training process. 280
Sometimes the disaggregated nature of legal offshoring makes it difficult
for offshore attorneys to understand the larger picture behind the work they
are doing. But a sense of the ultimate goal can help even in basic tasks like
document review. As one LPO manager reported, attorneys who understand
the nature of the project will have a better sense of how to avoid mistakes:
[I]n order for the quality procedures to be put in place, this first
step of getting the team to recognize what is an error for that
particular process, is vital. . . . I realized that the team was not
really aware of what the process was all about. They were merely
performing the tasks told like automatons without the faintest idea
of why they were doing it. An explanation of the whys and
wherefores of client requirements serves to bring the team to an
understanding of why a particular document needs to be done in a
particular manner. Once the team sees the reason and logic in the
work they are engaged in, they can then see for themselves what
the client means when she cries ‘error.’ 281

Taking the time to provide feedback and communication about offshored
work may be viewed as an additional cost for the client that is added to the
already-existing monitoring costs. However, it is a cost that may reduce
other transaction costs, especially if it increases the overall quality of the
work over time. Such communication may also help in the relationshipbuilding realm; given how many offshore outsourcing contracts are renewed
after their expiration, it makes some sense to pay attention to the long-term
relationship of the client and vendor. Furthermore, such individual feedback
may help ensure that offshore employees feel that they are valued by the
client, thus increasing overall loyalty and reducing the likelihood that
disgruntled employees will engage in harmful acts, such as breaching
confidentiality. 282
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Rosemary Ambale, Pins in Underwear & Quality Set-Ups Part II, LEGAL
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Negotiating Status and Resources

Moving toward a collaborative model will require all parties in the
outsourcing relationship to renegotiate relative status and resources. Social
exchange theory tells us that parties in a business relationship will engage in
power balancing over time in order to stabilize the relationship. 283 Within
the outsourcing context, actively working toward such power balancing can
improve the parties’ collaboration and thus improve quality outcomes. 284
Status and power are closely related. 285 In the outsourcing context,
however, onshore workers are typically viewed as having higher status than
offshore workers. 286 Improving collaboration requires that these status
differences be smoothed out. One outsourcing manager in the banking
industry stressed that, due to cultural prejudices, onshore employees
sometimes “want to treat Indians as second class citizens” and that much of
his job was to “make sure that did not occur” because allowing such status
differences to affect the project would destroy offshore employees’
innovation. 287 This reaction may result from the unspoken psychological
contract: when onshore clients demonstrate respect for the intellectual
contributions of their offshore partners, offshore employees perceive such
contributions to be a valued part of the employment contract. When such
contributions are not valued, they will not become part of the psychological
contract, regardless of what the written contract may say.
Negotiating status also requires attention to the elements of the
psychological contract that may vary by culture. For example, employees
may have very different expectations about how deeply managers should
become involved in the day-to-day work. One observer who spent time in
England, France, and India, found that “in London and Paris, the team hated
interference from a manager,” as the team members “wanted to be steered
in the right direction and then just left alone to get on with their work.” 288 In
India, on the other hand, “the same tactic created a group of disgruntled
colleagues who felt that their manager was distant and uninterested.” 289

283. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Shane R. Thye, A Status Value Theory of Power in
Exchange Relations, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 407 (2000) (noting that power dependence theory also
predicts that “power imbalanced relations [will] evolve toward a balanced state by activating
one or several power-balancing operations”).
284. Levina & Vaast, supra note 149, at 320–25 (discussing the importance of
renegotiating status differences).
285. Thye, supra note 283, at 408.
286. Levina & Vaast, supra note 149, at 320; see also supra Part III.C.
287. Levina & Vaast, supra note 149, at 320.
288. KOBAYASHI-HILLARY & SYKES, supra note 76, at 149.
289. Id.
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Thus, management strategies aimed at empowering employees requires
sensitivity to these cultural differences.
There is a risk, however, that sensitivity to cultural management styles
will bleed over into cultural bias and a hardening of status differences.
Cultural stereotypes can provide a convenient excuse for collaborative
failures on both sides. 290 One outsourcing study of software development
found that “[i]t was easy for onshore developers to say their Indian
colleagues failed to collaborate because ‘they were expect[ing] to be spoonfed specifications’ and for the Indian participants to blame failure on poorly
specified requirements from onshore ‘higher-ups.’” 291
Acknowledging cultural differences without resorting to stereotypes
requires some amount of cultural blending. 292 Cultural blending represents
“an effort to create shared values, norms, and beliefs and is considered a
critical element of control in offshore outsourcing.” 293 Outsourcing
managers can use symbolic capital (“the power to name things and institute
an order among things”) to negotiate these boundaries. 294 In one case,
“stereotypical descriptions of attitudes to authority in India and Russia
exhibited themselves when the individuals in question insisted on
maintaining them rather than reflecting upon them to arrive at joint
norms.” 295 However, as the parties collaborated over time with each other,
“collaborative projects led to the accumulation of shared capital.” 296
Successful managers played a key role in developing this shared capital;
they were “willing and able to use the economic, intellectual, social, and
symbolic capital they ha[d] accumulated to renegotiate status
hierarchies.” 297 They used the “symbolic significance” of their management
positions to encourage collaborative attitudes, used their technical
competence to train onshore and offshore team members and develop their
intellectual capital, used financial resources to integrate team members
through visits and meetings, and drew on social connections to assist in the
process. 298 Such a renegotiation of status and resource requires significant
effort, but reciprocal visits, cultural immersion, and training aid the process
of cultural blending across the onshore and offshore team members. 299
290.
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Barriers to Collaboration

Although a collaborative model of outsourcing has significant
advantages over the disaggregation model, it is subject to criticism in
several respects. First, some industry participants have a sense that
collaboration may be unnecessary for more straightforward, repetitive tasks
such as first-level document review 300—the type of work that, in Susskind’s
terms, is already “commoditized.” 301 Certainly, low-level work (still 85% of
the non-IP legal outsourcing field 302) may require a lower degree of
collaboration than more complex legal research and drafting. But while it is
true that tasks such as document review can be carried out much more
autonomously than brief writing or legal strategy, even commoditized work
can benefit from a collaborative perspective, as parties work together to fit
the commoditized work within the broader legal strategy. As the employees
of outsourcing firms have noted, they can do better work when they
understand the context in which they are doing it. 303 Collaboration in
document review, database management, or administrative support tasks
may involve simply communicating the nature of the project, listening when
the vendor offers suggestions, and providing feedback regarding the client’s
level of satisfaction with the work. The collaborative activity does not have
to be extensive or time-consuming—even these minor actions can improve
the overall representation.
A more significant problem with the collaboration model is financial:
adopting a collaborative model may raise concerns about shared malpractice
liability for negligent representation. As one commentator has pointed out,
an explicit disaggregation model that clearly “spell[s] out . . . the division of
responsibilities” of the various parties may insulate against claims of joint
or vicarious liability. 304 When the client hires the outsourcing firm, the risk
of vicarious liability may be lessened. 305 However, when the U.S. counsel
performs a more collaborative “quarterbacking” function, 306 directing the
legal strategy and determining which party (inside counsel, U.S. counsel, or

300. Stratman, supra note 131, at 285 (suggesting that “[w]ell-understood, standardized
service processes, that are not core capabilities of the firm” can be “successfully decoupled” or
disaggregated).
301. See SUSSKIND, supra note 238, at 27–33.
302. See Ganz, supra note 35.
303. See supra Part IV.B.2.
304. Richmond, supra note 235, at 495.
305. Id. (“[T]here are times when clients, rather than lawyers, retain co-counsel. In such
matters, it is generally the case that neither lawyer should be vicariously liable for the other’s
alleged negligence or misconduct.”).
306. See supra Part III.A.1.
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an LPO vendor) should perform the various components, then the risk of
vicarious liability may be greater.
Transaction cost theory suggests that this risk can be managed by
“tighten[ing] control through well-designed contracts.” 307 The potential
liability risk is one cost of the outsourcing relationship. Because the
corporate client benefits from greater collaboration among legal service
providers, it may be willing to contract for a malpractice exclusion that
limits liability only for the individual party’s negligence or misconduct. To
the extent that outside counsel plays a significant role in directing the
outsourcing activity, it should request such a contract provision.
Finally, another risk of the collaborative model is that U.S. corporations’
“collaboration” with offshore entities will be viewed by the American
public in the term’s pejorative sense. 308 Those with a protectionist ideology
may view collaborative outsourcing as “traitorous cooperation.” 309 And
indeed, attorneys who believe their jobs to be at risk from outsourcing have
used just this rhetoric to describe other U.S. attorneys in the outsourcing
business. 310 Even former presidential candidate John Kerry referred to
businesses that engage in offshore outsourcing as “‘Benedict Arnold’
companies and CEOs,” in a reference to the famous traitor of the American
Revolutionary War. 311 Perhaps in response to some of these concerns,
companies and law firms involved in offshore outsourcing have kept their
efforts quiet. 312 In a recent survey of large law firms, eighty-three percent
refused to say whether they had engaged in offshore outsourcing. 313

307. Mao et al., supra note 254, at 483.
308. Clifford S. Zimmerman, “Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation:” Reflections on
Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 957, 963 n.21 (1999) (“Collaboration developed a pejorative connotation surrounding
World War II, commonly referring to those who worked with the enemy.”).
309. Id. (noting that the second definition of collaboration is “traitorous cooperation with
the enemy”).
310. See David Perla—Anti-American Traitor, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP
EDITION (Jan. 29, 2008), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2008/01/david-perla-antiamerican-traitor.html (“David Perla (UPenn undergrad/J.D.) in a vain attempt to gain publicity
and promote his traitorous and fledging outsourcing business, boasts about shipping American
legal jobs overseas in a recent law.com article . . . .”).
311. Saritha Rai, An Industry in India Cheers Bush’s Victory, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/04/business/worldbusiness/04outsource.html?_r=1&ref=wipr
oltd.
312. Geis, supra note 70, at 243.
313. Wall of Silence Surrounds Emerging Legal Outsourcing Industry, supra note 70 (“In a
Fronterion survey of 30 top US firms in the Am Law 50, some 83 percent declined to comment
on whether they had used legal process outsourcing (LPO) providers, despite the fact that
responses were confidential.”).
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In the long run, however, it seems unlikely that legal outsourcing will
significantly harm the reputations of either corporate clients or the law firms
who assist them in outsourcing projects. First, outsourcing in other sectors
has become too commonplace to seriously impair corporate reputations. 314
Second, as Professor Vikramaditya Khanna noted in a recent presentation,
the American public is less likely to sympathize with the plight of displaced
lawyers, who are still seen as more privileged than the average worker. 315
Finally, globalization—both in and out of the legal field—is rapidly
increasing. 316 Studies have shown that lower levels of ethnocentrism are
correlated with more favorable attitudes toward outsourcing. 317 Thus, as the
legal profession continues its transnational growth, it appears likely that
controversy over legal offshoring and outsourcing will diminish.
D.

Moving Toward Collaboration

The disaggregation/collaboration dichotomy is ultimately a secondary
concern to clients in need of legal services. Their primary concerns are that
the legal services will be rendered cost effectively without sacrificing
competence, quality, or other ethical duties. Disaggregating the legal
process by sending some work offshore greatly reduces legal costs, but a
true disaggregation model also carries enhanced risks of ethical failure.
Agency theory suggests that residual loss arises when the disparity between
a principal’s and agent’s interests is not eliminated by contract. 318 As
disaggregation increases the numbers of contracted agents, the risks of such
residual loss increase. These risks include the possibility that offshore
employees may breach confidentiality, that disaggregated responsibility will
314. See, e.g., Rose Brady, Growth in Outsourcing, Like It or Not, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/management_
innovation/blog/archives/2009/08/growth_in_outso.html (noting that a recent survey of
corporate executives “found that while 79% of executives recognize that outsourcing may have
a poor public perception, most (72%) nonetheless decide to go ahead with it” and “74% of
executives think outsourcing helps a company survive in today’s economy; 70% say that money
saved by outsourcing can help a company grow, and 60% believe outsourcing makes a company
more agile and flexible”).
315. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Exploring the Effects of Legal Process Outsourcing to India,
Presentation at the International Legal Ethics Conference IV, Stanford Law School, July 16,
2010.
316. Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice, 43 INT’L LAW. 943, 967 (2009)
(noting the “ever increasing volume of transnational legal practice” and discussing various
global initiatives in the legal field).
317. See Durvasula & Lysonski, supra note 87, at 28 (“Consumers who exhibit higher
levels of ethnocentrism and greater economic threat are likely to show less favorable attitudes
toward offshoring.”).
318. See supra Part II.A.1.
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allow crucial tasks to fall through the cracks, or that failure to properly
supervise the legal process will produce substandard work.
Moving to a collaborative model can minimize some of these risks.
Focusing on long-term cooperation and building institutional mechanisms
to seek feedback from offshore partners can improve the quality of services
rendered. Offshore employees who are closely involved in the day-to-day
work are likely to have valuable suggestions for managing risks and
enhancing quality. Communication is crucial to this endeavor—in addition
to accepting feedback from offshore partners, clients should also provide
feedback regarding the success or failure of individual assignments.
Regardless of whether the offshored work involves high-level research or
low-level document review, the offshore attorneys will more fully
understand the context of the work and will feel more invested in the
process. Finally, outsourcing managers should make efforts to smooth out
status differences among onshore and offshore employees, avoiding reliance
on cultural stereotypes, investing economic, intellectual, social, and
symbolic capital in team members, and assisting with cultural blending.
There are a number of concrete steps that parties can take to create a
more collaborative outsourcing environment. First, institutionalized training
programs can help build collaboration. Unlike single-location firms where
junior employees may be expected to absorb key information informally,
outside service providers will almost certainly need to be trained on the
background and specific needs of the client. 319 Formalizing the training
program may take time at the front end, but it is likely to pay off in greater
productivity. Institutional training programs are a way of sharing
intellectual capital through the development of technical skills. Such
training programs also provide a mechanism for sharing social capital, as
employees form connections with the more senior people leading the
training sessions. 320
Second, onshore and offshore partners can engage in employee
exchanges to deepen personal relationships. Although technology can assist
in the outsourcing process generally, some amount of face-to-face contact
may deepen collaboration in ways that technology alone cannot. Pangea3,
for example, reported that one U.S. client invited an Indian attorney to
spend several months on-site in the United States; the individuals involved
in the legal work got to know each other better, and training could be
provided at the client’s home site. 321
319.
320.
321.
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Third, clients should discuss outsourcing vendors’ internal employment
practices. 322 The conditions under which the individual employees work can
make a significant difference to the end result. Employees with unmet
expectations may feel little or no loyalty to the employer, and may be more
likely to engage in disloyal or opportunistic conduct. 323
Finally, clients hiring offshore legal service providers should work to
develop a shared understanding of the project at all levels. One legal
professional suggested that the best way to do this is to “[g]ive the [f]irst
[a]ssignment to [y]ourself”—that is, for the client to share early on in the
outsourced work. 324 For a document review project, that might mean that
the client would actually “sit down and code documents [them]self for an
hour, a day, a week or even a month.” 325 Sharing in the work builds a shared
understanding, as the client would better understand whether the review
parameters were reasonable, how fast employees could be expected to
review the documents, and whether additional training was needed. 326 Such
a practice could also smooth status differences, as onshore workers shared
in the same work performed offshore. 327
CONCLUSION
International outsourcing is quickly reshaping the practice of law.
Sending legal services offshore does not merely shift existing legal practice
to a lower-cost provider. Instead, as in the Ali G case, it can change the
nature of the services rendered, moving cases from settlement to
adjudication on the merits and making additional legal services affordable.
Cost savings from outsourcing may mean that a libel defendant can afford
to fight a frivolous case rather than submit to a nuisance settlement or that a
criminal defendant can fully litigate procedural motions and substantive
defenses.
While cost difference may drive the initial outsourcing decision,
however, cost differences alone cannot sustain it in the long run. If
Thomson
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available
at
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322. See Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2111 (noting that clients are beginning to take a
greater interest in the “internal practices and procedure” of their law firms).
323. See supra Part III.B (describing situations in which unpaid contractors threatened to
reveal confidential information).
324. Julia Staunton Hardinger, Accountability Cannot Be Outsourced, ORG. LEGAL PROF.,
http://www.theolp.org/Default.aspx?pageId=512198 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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offshoring is to be strategically effective as well as cost effective, parties
must not limit their attention to financial cost alone. Instead, they should be
aware of other factors that influence the success or failure of the
outsourcing relationship. Socioeconomic and organizational theories related
to outsourcing can help predict where risks will arise from differing
incentives in the contracting process. In addition, understanding the
situational context of the outsourcing process can help predict risks that
arise from gaps in the allocation of responsibility or from cultural
misunderstandings. Once potential risks have been identified, the parties to
the outsourcing process can take steps to close those gaps and to improve
compliance with professional duties.
If legal offshoring is to be a viable and sustainable option, clients should
not view it as merely disaggregating legal work and sending it to the lowest
bidder. Parties seeking a successful offshoring practice should instead adopt
a collaborative model that builds relationships with both onshore and
offshore legal service providers, working cooperatively with the provider
best able to complete the projects, maintaining reciprocal communication,
managing cultural differences, and acknowledging each participant’s
contribution to the whole.

